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This thesis provides an original analysis of the writings of American poet Theodore Roethke 
(1908-1963). Specifically, this thesis argues that in order to be more fully understood Roethke’s 
writings ought to be examined within an existential philosophical context, and not merely within 
literary, psychoanalytic, or ecocritical contexts.  Towards this end, this thesis provides an 
abundance of original research that exposes the existential influences that impressed themselves 
upon Theodore Roethke and that shaped his identity as a poet.  It argues that Danish existentialist 
Søren Kierkegaard (1813-1855) exerted a particularly strong influence on Roethke, and thus an 
extensive amount of time is spent connecting Kierkegaard and Roethke and showing how 
Roethke’s writing reflects elements of Kierkegaard’s philosophy, especially on the issues of 
anxiety, despair, and paradox. Additionally, this thesis also demonstrates how Roethke’s writing, 
especially in his poetry of death, struggle, and natural growth, contains a sense of resurgent 
dynamism akin to that which is found in the tradition of vitalism, and it shows that understanding 
Roethke within this tradition helps us to understanding him more broadly as an existential poet.   
Ultimately this thesis provides an original analysis of Roethke as an existential poet, and it shows 
how Roethke’s readings of philosophy, and especially of Kierkegaard’s philosophy, directly 
influenced the existential character of his poetry.  Drawing this connection – which is done in more 
detail in this thesis than in any previous work of Roethke scholarship – allows for many of 
Roethke’s recurring poetic themes, such as growth, death, paradox, and pedagogy to be understood 
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In the last quarter-century there has not been much academic work that focuses on 
creating a sustained reading of the work of American poet Theodore Roethke (1908-1963). Most 
major studies concerning Roethke and his work appeared from the last few years preceding his 
death to the mid-1980s. To risk sounding dramatic, his larger body of work – apart from a few 
canonical pieces such as “My Papa’s Waltz” and “In a Dark Time” – seems to have been left out 
of influential reappraisals of modernist poetry in the last few decades, particularly as the 
dominance of transnational approaches has foregrounded well-traveled poets whose work 
engages with imperialism, the hegemony (or not) of the nation-state, and the global political 
landscape.  
However, of the extant recent scholarship on Roethke, some important trends can be 
identified. The secondary literature surrounding Roethke’s poetry can broadly be classified into 
five different categories: psychoanalytic interpretations, ecocritical interpretations, mystical 
interpretations, inheritance/influence interpretations, and formalist interpretations (all of which 
are represented in the appended bibliography). Of course, any attempt at this kind of 
classification will fail in some way, and there will be works that do not fit in any category or are 
squarely between two categories.1 The point of this attempt at classification is to reveal a 
noteworthy gap in Roethke scholarship: a serious engagement with the existential dimensions of 
Roethke’s poetry (Specifically in the tradition of Søren Kierkegaard). The need for such a study 
is, as will be demonstrate in this project, overwhelming, and until such a project has been 
undertaken there will be a significant gap in Roethke studies.  
                                                 





This lapse in the scholarship may be attributable to multiple causes. Firstly, most of these 
authors were focused on pursuing ends other than those of existential philosophical concern, and 
thus must not have been motivated to pursue this connection.2 Secondly, those who did recognize 
the connection may have taken the obvious and explicit connection between Roethke and 
Kierkegaard to constitute a comprehensive understanding of this connection. Their reticence on 
this topic suggests that they think understanding the Kierkegaardian existential character of 
Roethke’s only discloses information about Roethke’s work to a very limited extent, whereas I 
think the influence and similarity in style extends beyond the mere explicit statements of 
influence made by Roethke.  Throughout this thesis I will contend that there is a generally 
existential, and particularly Kierkegaardian vision of existence at the core of Roethke’s oeuvre.  
 
 Extant studies of Roethke’s poetry have accomplished a great deal in analyzing the many 
dimensions of his life and work.  However, these studies have failed adequately to examine the 
existential vision of life that undergirds and infuses the broad body of his work. I will justify this 
claim by extensively examining his poetic writings, his journal entries, and his prose writings.  In 
the first half of this thesis – apart from my analysis of “Duet” - I will primarily focus on notes, 
letters, and prose writings by Roethke; in the second half of it I will focus primarily on his 
poetry.   
No fewer than seven scholars have made cursory mention of Kierkegaardian elements 
and influences on Roethke’s oeuvre, but only as a peripheral concern.3 Instead of as a peripheral 
                                                 
2 Blessing’s book is an exception. He explicitly deals with themes which would be helped by an 
existential analysis, but does not pursue it. I can only speculatively attribute this to a different 
way of thinking about similar things, or that he did not have a background in existential analysis.  
3 The seven scholars I am referring to here are Neal Bowers, Richard Blessing, Karl Malkoff, 
Rosemary Sullivan, Ladislava Khailova, George Wendt, and Leigh-Anne Duke.  Citations of 




concern, I will make the examination of the existential and Kierkegaardian character of 
Roethke’s poetry the primary concern of this project.  Studying Roethke in this way should help 
illuminate certain elements of Roethke’s work that have been previously unexamined or 
understudied. First I will make some admittedly speculative attempts at tracing the lines of 
existential philosophical influence on Roethke – especially as they appear as clues in the poem 
“Duet.”  Then I will examine some general existential themes that appears in Roethke – such as 
death-in-life, self-identity, and mortality – before drawing a connection between Roethke’s 
vitalistic language and the existential process of self-discovery and self-examination.  Finally I 
will discuss the specific relationship between Kierkegaard’s thoughts on paradox and pedagogy 
and relate them to Roethke’s thinking on the same topic. 
1.1 Kierkegaard and Roethke on Time and Understanding: A Methodological Justification 
 In my endeavor to demonstrate the Kierkegaardian character of Roethke’s poetry I will 
initially take a backwards-facing perspective.  This perspective assumes that something 
meaningful can be understood about Roethke’s work by beginning at the end of his poetic career 
and moving backwards through his work.  This methodological position has the potential to 
disclose much of the essential character of Roethke’s thought; it assumes that Roethke’s life and 
work existed on an intelligible trajectory of thought, and it demonstrates that Roethke’s 
existential thought became more explicitly disclosed near the end of his life, but that even 
Roethke’s early work contained many existential elements. There is much to be found in his 
notebooks, poetry, and prose to support this claim regarding the trajectory of his thought. 
Moreover, while this backwards-facing methodology may seem unwarranted, the justification for 
this mode of analysis itself – as well as the inspiration for it – will disclose a significant amount 




 One major idea that Roethke took up from Kierkegaard is the idea that we are 
fundamentally riven between past and future; that there is a temporal tension that is an essential 
constituent of what it means to be human. According to this idea, the ephemeral is also clashing 
with the eternal.  The ephemeral (the successive series of day-to-day experiences) clashes with 
the eternal (detached, absolute ideality) in what Kierkegaard calls “the moment.”4  We are 
always pulled towards the past and thrown into the future.  We reflect on all that has happened – 
how we have gotten to be how we are – while always being thrust forward into the indefinite 
future. There is a dramatic synthesis between these two oppositional temporal forces, and thus 
we are always in the process of navigating this conflicting tension between past and future. The 
self is not a stable being that simply moves through time, but the self is itself the activity of 
negotiating this irreconcilable temporal tension. Kierkegaard’s ideas about time, identity, and 
self-understanding are succinctly captured in well-regarded quote from one Kierkegaard’s 
notebooks: “It is perfectly true, as the philosophers say, that life must be understood backwards. 
But they forget the other proposition, that it must be lived forwards.”5 This quote has become 
perhaps one of the most famous quotes associated with Kierkegaard.  It is also quite clear that 
this Kierkegaardian quote had a significant effect on Roethke’s thinking about temporality and 
self-understanding.  In tracing back Roethke’s allusions to this Kierkegaardian idea we can find 
                                                 
4 The majority of this I take from Kierkegaard’s The Concept of Anxiety: A Simple 
Psychologically Orienting Deliberation on the Dogmatic Issue of Hereditary Sin (1844) which 
he wrote under the pseudonym Vigilius Haufniensis.  The text will also be referred to in the next 
section. The following quote is emblematic Kierkegaard’s thinking about time: “The moment is 
that ambiguity in which time and eternity touch each other, and with this the concept of 
temporality is posited, whereby time constantly intersects eternity and eternity constantly 
pervades time. As a result, the above-mentioned division acquires its significance: the present 
time, the past time, the future time…. The pivotal concept in Christianity, that which made all 
things new, is the fullness of time, but the fullness of time is the moment as the eternal, and yet 
this eternal is also the future and the past.” (CA 89-90)   




him make mention of it as early as 1946 – almost two full decades before Kierkegaard’s name 
ever explicitly appeared in Roethke’s poetry. A reference to this Kierkegaardian idea by Roethke 
can be first found in a letter he wrote to the critic Kenneth Burke in 1946.  In this letter Roethke 
writes: “One belief: ‘One must go back to go forwards.’”6  While this is a bit of a corruption of 
Kierkegaard’s original quote, and even though Roethke did not take the time to directly attribute 
Kierkegaard as an inspiration for this line of thinking, the essential spirit of the quote remains: 
looking backwards is a good way to understand how things ended up the way that they did, but 
inevitably you must always continue projecting yourself and your thought into anticipations of 
the future and into the future itself.   
Later in his personal notebooks Roethke again references this Kierkegaardian idea.  In 
this case his reference to this idea is much closer to the original line by Kierkegaard. While in the 
following passage Roethke still does not mention Kierkegaard by name, the quote is clearly a 
reference to a Kierkegaardian idea. Roethke’s notebook entry almost perfectly duplicates 
Kierkegaard’s journal entry from 1843. Roethke writes: “Life can only be understood 
backwards; but it must be lived forwards.”7 Kierkegaard’s thought clearly shaped Roethke’s, and 
this section has shown just one instance of this influence among the many that exist.  Many more 
instances of influence will be shown as this thesis proceeds.  This section has also demonstrated 
that Roethke did not always directly give Kierkegaard attributional credit for lines and ideas that 
he derived from the philosopher.  Only later in his life did Roethke begin frequently to make 
explicit reference to Kierkegaard, but existential and Kierkegaardian themes interpenetrate 
                                                 
6 This information about this letter was found in an article written in 2017 by Adam Kirsch of 
The New Yorker. The article’s title is “Primal Ear,” and I refer to it later on page 15 as well. 




Roethke’s work – from his first book of poetry, Open House, written in 1942, until his death 
twenty-one years later in 1963.   
 1.2 Clues About Roethke’s Existential Background Found in “Duet” 
 We should – as readers of Roethke and Kierkegaard – take this idea about understanding 
backwards but living forwards seriously.  So seriously, in fact, as to shape how to go about this 
examination of Roethke’s existential influences.  I will start by “looking backwards” at 
Roethke’s poetic and prosaic career so as to gain perspective and understanding on the question 
of how much Roethke was influenced by Kierkegaard and other existentialists. Then, with 
whatever understanding we have gleaned from this task in mind, we will move backwards into 
an examination of Roethke’s earlier poetry and prose.  
The task that I will pursue in the rest of this chapter will be to give concreteness to my 
claim Roethke had a deep awareness of the existential tradition, and specifically of Kierkegaard.  
I will mine Roethke’s late-life poem “Duet” for backward-facing clues about Roethke’s 
existential influences.  Only after this, and in the following chapters, will I actually interpret 
Roethke’s earlier poems in terms of the existential themes, modalities, and concepts that they 
display.  With “Duet” I will primarily interpret it by looking for the clues pertaining to existential 
thinkers that it might make reference to. 
 “Duet” is comprised of a dialogue between a couple regarding their thoughts and 
feelings regarding Kierkegaard.  The poem displays a deep familiarity with Kierkegaard’s major 
ideas and literary style, but it also displays an awareness of the existential tradition more 
generally. To my knowledge there has been no academic investigation of this poem from a 
philosophical historical perspective, but it most certainly warrants one.  I will copy the poem in 




funny musical quality about it which is worth remarking on, but I will not address this quality 
here and will instead focus on what it shows us about Roethke’s philosophical background.  
She: Oh when you were little, you were really big: 
 Now you run to the money, it’s jig, jig, jig; 
 You’re becoming that horror, a two-legged pig 
Both: - In spite of Soren Kierkegaard. 
 
He: I’ll face all that, and the Divine Absurd: 
 You be an adverb, I’ll be a verb, 
 I’ll spit over my chin and beyond the curb, 
Both: - And close up that chapter of Kierkegaard. 
 
She: We’ll sail away from the frightful shore 
 Of multiple choice and Either/or 
 To the land where the innocent stretch and snore 
Both:   -With never a thought for Kierkegaard. 
 
She: I’m shanty Irish 
He:  --And pissoir French? 
She: I’m a roaring girl, an expensive wench, 
Both: But at least we know one needn’t blench 
 -In fear and trembling, dear Kierkegaard. 
 
She: A mistress of Zen, I’ll bite your thumb, 
 I’ll jump on your belly, I’ll kick your bum 
 Till you come to the land of Kingdom Come 
 
Both: -Far beyond, O Beyond! Dear Kierkegaard. 
He: My jug, my honey, my can of beer, 
She: My ex-existentialist darling dear, 
Both: Should Dame Anxiety ever come near 
 We’ll give each other a box on the ear, 
 -In honor of Father Kierkegaard8 
 
First I will make note of some of the more general existential appearances in this poem before 
moving towards the specifically Kierkegaardian elements of it.   
The last stanza of this poem seems to wink and nod at both Heidegger and Unamuno.  
The line “My jug, my honey, my can of beer/ My ex-existentialist darling dear” appears to be 
                                                 




making a playful reference to Heidegger’s essay titled “The Thing.” In “The Thing” Heidegger 
provides an intensive examination of the phenomenology of thingness (what we might call 
human-object relationality) by exhaustively examining a certain kind of thing: a jug.  
Heidegger’s jug – which contains alcohol in the form of wine - is a site of world-disclosure for 
him. In “The Thing” Heidegger speaks exhaustively of the “jug,” mentioning this word (Krug) 
over a hundred times in the essay.  Heidegger speaks of the difference between a vessel, 
container, and jug, the difference between an object and a thing, and what the thingness of the 
thing consists in.  In this essay – which is both well-regarded and often satirized – Heidegger, in 
his fashion, delivers bizarre lines which are sometimes considered esoteric or inscrutable, such as 
“But from the objectness of the object, and from the product's self-support, there is no way that 
leads to the thingness of the thing. What in the thing is thingly?”9 Regarding the discussion of the 
jug, which dominates the essay, Heidegger records ideas about things such as: 
The jug's jugness resides in its being qua vessel. We become aware of the vessel's 
holding nature when we fill the jug. The jug's bottom and sides obviously take on the task 
of holding. But not so fast! When we fill the jug with wine, do we pour the wine into the 
sides and bottom? At most, we pour the wine between the sides and over the bottom. 
Sides and bottom are, to be sure, what is impermeable in the vessel.10 
 
It’s unclear exactly what the meaning of this reference is for Roethke, but it does seem that he is 
faintly mocking it while simultaneously expressing a familiarity with Heidegger.11 Roethke was 
                                                 
9 “The Thing” in Poetry, Language, Thought 165 
10 Ibid. 166/167 
11 More speculatively the mention of “my honey” in Roethke’s poem could be a reference to the 
relationship between the bee and honey that Heidegger discusses late in his Fundamental 
Concepts. I think this is less likely simply because this text by Heidegger is less well-known than 
“The Thing.”  However, just in case, here is an example of Heidegger’s discussion of bees and 
honey.  Note that he writes “honey” where he should write “nectar”: “A bee [is] placed before a 
little bowl filled with so much honey that the bee [is] unable to suck up the honey all at once. It 
begins to suck and then after a while breaks off this driven activity of sucking and flies off, 
leaving the rest of the honey still present in the bowl….  Yet … if its abdomen is carefully cut 




a well-known beer drinker – who brewed his own beer12 and had delirium tremens in the hospital 
from drinking so much of it13 – so it would make sense why he would jestingly replace 
Heidegger’s jug of wine with his own can of beer.  This would keep in line with the identity he 
cultivated for himself, as he was known to say “I may look like a beer salesman, but I’m a 
poet.”14 Roethke was also known to dislike dense academic prose of the sort that characterizes 
Heidegger’s writing, so it would make sense why Roethke might suggest that Heidegger’s 
writing could turn someone into an “ex-existentialist.”  In any case, it certainly seems that 
Roethke makes a sly reference to Heidegger in this poem, and this would make all the more 
sense given that there is a strong connection of influence between Kierkegaard and Heidegger. 
 My claim that Roethke is making a reference to Miguel de Unamuno in this poem might 
be considered more interesting than the claim about Heidegger for a number of reasons.  Firstly, 
because Unamuno is a somewhat less well-known existential philosophical figure than 
Heidegger, and also because Unamuno is a figure more uniquely aligned with Kierkegaard.  In 
The Tragic Sense of Life – which is Unamuno’s most existential philosophical work – Unamuno 
repeatedly refers to Kierkegaard in familial terms, and most often as “brother Kierkegaard.”15 
Unamuno thought of Kierkegaard as a “spiritual Brother” insofar as Unamuno recognized that 
Kierkegaard thought of the activity of the inner life in a way similar to the way that he himself 
                                                 
of the bee from behind. This shows conclusively that the bee by no means recognizes the 
presence of too much honey. It recognizes neither this nor even — though this would be expected 
to touch it more closely — the absence of its abdomen. There is no question of it recognizing any 
of this; it continues with its driven activity regardless precisely because it does not recognize that 
plenty of honey is still present.” (242) 
12 The Glass House 63 
13 Ibid. 90 
14 Ibid. 54 
15 Unamuno and Kierkegaard: Paths to Selfhood in Fiction by Jan E. Evans is a great resource 
for tracking the relationship between these two thinkers, and she documents Unamuno’s thinking 




did: as a dynamic tension between warring aspects of the self.  Unamuno also thought of 
Kierkegaard (along with Pascal and St. Augustine) as sharers in his “tragic sense of life.” 
Roethke appears to carry on in the tradition of Unamuno by referring to Kierkegaard in “Duet” in 
familial terms: “Father Kierkegaard.”  To my knowledge no Roethke scholars have made 
mention of a relationship of influence between Unamuno and Roethke.  However, this does not 
mean that one does not exist.  In fact, if we dig into Roethke’s letters and notebooks we can find 
concrete evidence to prove that Roethke knew of Unamuno. Proving this makes it more likely 
that Roethke was indeed cleverly making reference to Unamuno in “Duet.” 
In the spring of 1940 Roethke (who was at that point spending time in his hometown of 
Saginaw, Michigan) sent an eccentric letter to his then-girlfriend Kitty Stokes, who was at the 
time employed at Swarthmore College in Pennsylvania.16 The letter is noteworthy for a number 
of reasons, least of all because he expressed a curious interest in the olfactory character of bear 
caves.  But most important for the purpose of this investigation is the fact that Roethke explicitly 
expressed an interest in “that Spanish philosopher” Unamuno, and if one has found Unamuno, 
then one is almost certainly familiar with Kierkegaard.  Here follows a passage from that letter: 
1) Can you get any dope on how bears’ caves look and smell after hibernation? 2) Is 
that book Culture and Christianity in the library or ever ordered, Oxford Press, can’t 
think of author? 3) Are there any books by Unamuno, that Spanish philosopher? 4) 
Make a double set of Phoenix if you have time.17 
 
The question that Roethke asks in this passage does not reveal too much about Roethke’s 
knowledge of Unamuno; if anything it reveals that Roethke, at least at the time, did not know 
very much about Unamuno.  But this also raises the question of time and biography, especially if 
we are trying to trace the history of Roethke’s interest in the existentialists.   
                                                 
16 The Glass House 121 




 Curiously, there is some reason to think that the above quote – which is thought to have 
been written in 1940 – may have actually been written at least a decade later than 1940.  There 
are two reasons why this claim, if true, would be relevant to this examination. Firstly, it would 
move the time of Roethke’s exposure to Unamuno closer to the time that he wrote “Duet.”  If 
this were true, this would make it seem more likely – at least prima facie – that Roethke was 
making reference to Unamuno in his mention of “Father Kierkegaard.”  This is because 
Unamuno would be more fresh on his mind, so to speak.  Given that this putatively 1940 
reference is the only explicit reference I was able to find that Roethke makes to Unamuno, this 
would make it seem unlikely that a full two decades later a clever Unamuno reference appeared 
in Roethke’s poetry.  But if this gap of time were actually shorter, then the plausibility of the 
reference would consequently become more believable. Secondly, if this quote were misdated, 
this would fit in with what seems to be the case in Roethke’s exposure and references to the 
existentialists: that he read and talked about them later in his life, and that they did not much 
influence him earlier in his life. In an atypical chronology, existentialism seemed to attract 
Roethke’s attention more in his latter life than in his formative and youthful years. While some 
may think that the core messages of existentialism are more attractive to anxious youth, this is 
simply just not the case for Roethke. The first Kierkegaard reference that I have documented in 
this paper comes from 1946, when he was 37 or 38, and they then appear sporadically after that, 
before finally appearing frequently in his last few years of life and death at the age of 55. As a 
final point, it would be a bit surprising if Roethke were exposed to Unamuno before he was 
exposed to Kierkegaard, given that Kierkegaard is generally regarded as the significantly more 
influential figure in intellectual (and perhaps literary) history.  Thus one would expect an 




same way that one might expect a randomly selected American student to be familiar with 
Robert Frost but maybe not with Theodore Roethke.  
Given these two considerations outlined above, we should at least investigate whether or 
not there is good reason to believe that the above quote is not actually from 1940.  As mentioned 
earlier, it turns out that there are a few reasons to be suspicious of the claim that this letter is 
from 1940.18 
The first reason for being suspicious of the claim that this latter is from 1940 is based on 
one of the other lines in the above-cited letter.  Roethke makes mention of a book titled Culture 
and Christianity right before he mentions Unamuno’s name.  However, no book of the title 
Culture and Christianity can be found.  But, upon further research, one can find that T.S. Eliot 
wrote a book titled Christianity and Culture in 1949.19  The simple difference in the title – the 
words “Christianity” and “Culture” in reverse order, is not enough to prove that Roethke could 
not possibly have been referencing this book, especially as his saying “can’t think of author?” 
suggests that his memory was a bit fuzzy at the time of composing the letter.  Moreover, to give 
context, in 1949, only 4 years after Eliot’s book was published, Roethke was himself in 
correspondence with T.S. Eliot. On August 5, 1953 Roethke sent Eliot a letter requesting Eliot to 
consider publishing Roethke’s children’s book.  Eliot kindly declined, but also expressed an 
interest in publishing some of Roethke’s poems.20  This establishes that around this time, 
between 1949 and 1953, Eliot was on Roethke’s mind.  Obviously, if Roethke was making 
                                                 
18 I should clarify that the claim I am questioning originates in The Glass House, which is the 
sole extant comprehensive written about Theodore Roethke.   
19 C.S. Lewis also wrote a short article titled “Christianity and Culture” in 1940, but this 14 page 
article could hardly be confused for a book. 




reference to Eliot’s book – which was first published in 1949 - his reference to Unamuno in the 
same letter could not have been from 1940.   
There are other, perhaps even stronger reasons to think that this letter is not from 1940.  
Earlier in the same year Roethke writes some interesting things that we can use to question 
whether or not this letter was even written to Kitty Stokes in the first place.  It seems that a 
reasonable case can be made – although by no means definitive – that this letter was actually 
written to Katherine Anne Porter, someone that we know that Roethke corresponded with well 
after he ended his relationship with Kitty Stokes.  Roethke corresponded with Porter into 1949, 
but seems to have cut off contact with Kitty Stokes around 1940.21   
An earlier part of the letter in which Roethke mentions Unamuno reads as follows: 
I made some pretty good butterscotch sauce, 1 ½ cups of light brown sugar, ¼ cup thin 
cream, ¼ cup corn syrup.  Cook until a drop of it makes a soft ball in cold water.  Don’t 
overcook. My mother isn’t much impressed by my cooking stories. She thinks it’s sort of 
sissy, I guess. Well, Katherine, if I were a model person, I would be polite and cheerful 
but everything seems empty and futile, it really does. Call this adolescent if you like.22 
 
There are two reasons to think this may indicate that the letter was written to Katherine Anne 
Porter.  First, he explicitly addresses the person that he is writing to as “Katherine.”  Kitty 
Stokes’ real name was Katherine, but he usually referred to her as Kitty.  Of course there is some 
attributional ambiguity that could result when one is corresponding with two people of the same 
name; they could easily get mixed up when trying to identify which Katherine he was actually 
writing to.  Because of this it could easily be the case that a letter thought to be written to Kitty 
Stokes could actually have been written to Katherine Anne Porter. It would seem odd to formally 
                                                 
21 The Roethke Archives shows indications of correspondence between Roethke and Porter into 
1949, the year in which the Eliot book came out, but no evidence of Roethke and Stokes 
communicating any time after 1940. 




refer to his girlfriend as “Katherine” in the informal context of this letter.  Moreover, in this letter 
he talks at length about cooking, and it is known that Roethke enjoyed cooking for Katherine 
Anne Porter.23 
 Given all of this, it at least seems possible that this letter was written later than 1940, and 
that Roethke’s first mention of Unamuno came later in his life.  However, even if this suspicion 
is ungrounded, and the letter was actually written to Kitty Stokes in 1940, then this process of 
inquiry has not been useless.  Firstly, if it was written in 1940 it would demonstrate that Roethke 
was quite familiar with existential philosophers even as a younger man, thus adding support to 
my claim that the entire body of Roethke’s work is deeply infused with existential themes and 
references.  
 Moreover, the attempt to trace Roethke’s correspondences reveals that he lived a very 
energetic social life – an existential energy that is heralded throughout his work. His life was 
punctuated by periods spent in psychiatric institutions – episodes that he connected with his 
hyper-energetic mode of living. He wrote that his major issues with mental health occurred 
during “high” periods of psychological activity, and these episodes corresponded with periods of 
prolific poetic production.  Of these prolific periods within institutions he even said “I’m at my 
best when I’m slightly depressed.”24  
He corresponded and spent time with scores of noteworthy authors and poets of his time 
– from Dylan Thomas to Robert Lowell to Louise Bogan to Stanley Kunitz – and it is in this 
lively intellectual milieu that we find the next possible juncture that Roethke could be possibly 
                                                 
23 Glass House 118. This passage mentions Roethke cooking for Katherine Anne Porter. It also 
mentions that he cooked for William Carlos Williams, but that the two never “hit it off” as 
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connected to Unamuno.  It will probably never be known if in fact the letter Seager cited was 
written to Kitty Stokes in 1940 or if it was written in 1949 or later; not all of the resources that 
Seager made use of in the 1960s seem to be in the archive today, and Roethke was not always in 
the habit of dating his letters. The mystery can remain, but what we can know for certain is that 
Roethke was aware of Unamuno, and that there is a possible reference to Unamuno in Roethke’s 
“Duet.”   
 I will present a final note on the connection between Unamuno and Roethke that also 
lends concreteness to the examination of the intellectual-philosophical milieu that Roethke 
participated in.  Jonathan Blunk’s recent biography of the American poet James Wright gives 
some new information on what Roethke did during his life, and it also gives new clues as to a 
period in which Roethke may have been being exposed to Unamuno.  In the section of the 
biography that chronicles Wright’s life between January and June of 1959 it is revealed that 
during this period Wright was undertaking an intensive study of the philosophy of Miguel de 
Unamuno, as well as Meister Eckhart25, Ortega y Gassett, and Nicolas Berdyaev.26  By this time 
Wright and Roethke had already developed an intense, public friendship. On August 22, 1957 
Roethke and Wright went to a world heavyweight boxing championship match held in Seattle 
between Pete Rademacher and Floyd Patterson.27  A letter written by Wright to Roethke almost a 
year later on August 5th, 1958 gives further evidence of the claim that Roethke and Wright were 
                                                 
25 Wright definitely did not introduce Roethke to Meister Eckhart.  In a passage from his 
notebooks in 1942 Roethke writes the names of these mystics without any context given: 
“Meister Eckhart St. Theresa of Avila, St. John of the Cross, St. Francis of Assisi.”  
Additionally, on page 199 of The Glass House Seager claims that Roethke had been studying the 
mystics since the 1930s.   
26 James Wright: A Life in Poetry 120 
27 This information was found in an article written in 2017 by Adam Kirsch in The New Yorker 




close friends who shared intimate aspects of their lives.  In this letter written to Roethke Wright 
candidly wrote “I have been depressed as hell. My stuff stinks, and you know it… What makes 
this so ironically depressing, as I say, is that I am trapped by the very thing—the traditional 
technique—which I labored so hard to attain…”28  The letter goes on in this vein.  We can 
assume from the contents of this letter and the familiarity of its tone that these two were close 
with one another.  Indeed, James Wright was one of Roethke’s students during Roethke’s early 
teaching days, and it appears that they stayed in contact fairly continually until Roethke’s death.  
While Roethke was staying in Halcyon House Sanitarium29 during early 1959 Wright would 
regularly come to visit him.  During these visits they would talk extensively.  One particularly 
interesting account that Wright gives of visiting Roethke during this period is as follows: 
When Dave Wagoner took me to visit Ted Roethke at his rest home in Washington last 
January, lo and behold! Theodore the Bear, squatting among the other accursed Huns in 
the violent ward, surveyed my middle fingers – for both hands were stained with nicotine 
– and quite sanely predicted my collapse.  And here I am.30 
 
This letter was written to Donald Hall in June of 1959 while Wright himself was staying at 
Glenwood Hills Hospital for his own mental health issues.  This letter testifies not only to a deep 
familiarity between these two – the student and the teacher learning from each other, a theme 
which we will explore later – but also to Roethke’s sensitivity to the inner life of others; he was 
able to predict Wright’s mental health struggles. Roethke was attuned to these possibilities – the 
vicissitudes of the inner life were his primary poetic concern. But, more to the point of tracing 
Unamuno’s influence on Roethke, based on all that has just been covered, we can safely assume 
that during this period Wright and Roethke talked about Unamuno and – somewhat fittingly – 
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The Tragic Sense of Life.  For during 1959 was when Wright was visiting Roethke frequently in 
the sanitarium, and 1959 is also when we know that Wright was in the middle of his close study 
of Unamuno.  
Whether it was Wright teaching Roethke about Unamuno or the other way around is 
something that we cannot know, but, in the context of Roethke’s Kierkegaardian-inflected 
pedagogy there is good reason to believe that either scenario is equally likely.  As I will discuss 
in the last section of this paper, on at least two different occasions Roethke quoted Kierkegaard’s 
claim that “Education begins when the teacher starts learning from the students.” For Roethke 
education flowed both ways between teacher and student.  More will be said about this idea later 
in the section on Roethke’s existential pedagogy. 
This initial foray through “Duet” – and my suspicion that Roethke’s mention of “Father 
Kierkegaard” was an oblique reference to Unamuno’s familial way of referring to Kierkegaard – 
has led to a confirmation that Roethke was aware of Unamuno, although it is still uncertain 
exactly when he began his study of Unamuno.  My study of the line “my jug, my honey, my can 
of beer” also made the case that this line contained an oblique and comedic reference to 
Heidegger within it; Roethke switches Heidegger’s more erudite jug of wine for a prosaic can of 
beer.  The poem, in its implicit and explicit references, makes it clear that Roethke was generally 
aware of the existential tradition, and was comfortable enough with it to joke about it. 
1.3 What “Duet” Reveals About Roethke’s Reading of Kierkegaard  
Given that my primary claim in this paper is that Roethke’s poetry is deeply 
Kierkegaardian, and given that Kierkegaard is the only existential philosopher explicitly named 
in “Duet,” we should now take care to examine what “Duet” displays (and does not display) 




Oddly enough, it seems that the only non-cursory commentary that considers this poem in 
a Kierkegaardian light can be found in Leigh-Ann Duke’s M.A. thesis titled “Existential 
Elements in the Poetry of Theodore Roethke” written for Lakehead University in 1980.31 While 
this thesis has been helpful in a number of ways, especially as it is the only resource that I know, 
other than the present thesis, that focuses specifically on Roethke and existentialism, her analysis 
of “Duet” seems to be missing the majority of the Kierkegaardian references that can be found 
embedded within this poem.   I will make it my task to undertake the first comprehensive 
Kierkegaardian analysis of Roethke’s poem “Duet,” and I will seek to draw out as much 
information regarding Roethke’s knowledge of Kierkegaard as this poem will give us. Duke’s 
analysis of this poem consists entirely of the following three sentences: 
“In fact, in the poem "Duet" he pokes fun at the whole existential of despair and anxiety 
over death. The poem is a dialogue between a man and a woman who, in the course of 
their exchanges, decide to dismiss Soren Kierkegaard and his notions of the Divine 
Absurd in his book Either/Or. They decide to live in hope and ‘give each other a box on 
the ear’ ‘Should Dame Anxiety ever come near.’”32 
 
However, as I will demonstrate, the poem “Duet” demonstrates that Roethke had a deep 
familiarity with several Kierkegaardian texts in addition to Either/Or, and in fact that 
Kierkegaard’s elaboration of the idea of the “Divine Absurd” does not really play a role in 
Either/Or.  Rather, Kierkegaard’s primary discussions of divinity and absurdity range across a 
number of other texts, primarily including Philosophical Fragments, to Stages on Life’s Way, to 
                                                 
31 Interestingly enough I have been able to get in contact with Leigh-Ann Duke, who now works 
as a language program administrator at Mount Royal University in Calgary. I let her now that 
I’m attempting a project similar to the one she undertook four decades ago, and she expressed 
strong interest in my project and a desire to see the final product. Ginevra Paparoni also briefly 
mentions “Duet” in a Kierkegaardian context in her 2016/2017 dissertation titled (in translation) 
“The Protestant Imagery in Theodore Roethke’s Early Poetry” written for the Università degli 
Study di Milano. Reference on page 54.  More information to be found in the appended 
bibliography. 




Fear and Trembling, to Concluding Unscientific Postscript.  The reference to the “Divine 
Absurd” could be linked to any of these texts.  However, as just mentioned, within Either/Or, 
Kierkegaard does not really concern itself with the problem of absurdity.  Either/Or, written 
under the pseudonym Victor Eremita, is concerned with two modes of living: aesthetically or 
ethically.  The drama of this philosophical novel is acted out by different characters (such as A, 
the aesthete, and Judge William, who represents the ethical exemplar) making a series of 
arguments as to why their chosen way of living is superior to the other’s. The title derives from 
the idea that one must take responsibility for one’s own life and choose which of these ways to 
live.  Choice-making, freedom, and a strong sense of individual responsibility undergird this 
philosophical project by Kierkegaard.  In lines 9 and 10 of “Duet” when Roethke mentioned this 
book – “We’ll sail away from the frightful shore/ Of multiple choice and Either/or” - he is 
clearly displaying a familiarity with Either/Or and Kierkegaard’s concept of the ethical and the 
aesthetic. But Roethke’s understanding of Kierkegaard is considerably more sophisticated than 
Duke gives him credit for, and “Duet” contains references to multiple Kierkegaardian texts, 
many of which are books with which only the serious reader of Kierkegaard would be familiar.  
Instead of being a reference to Either/Or, as Duke suggested, it is far more likely that 
Roethke’s reference to the “Divine Absurd” is derived from Kierkegaard’s Concluding 
Unscientific Postscript33, although it is also possible that it could be derived from one of the 
                                                 
33 For the sake of clarity it is important to note that Concluding Scientific Postscript was written 
under the pseudonym Johannes Climacus. At the end of The Point of View of My Work as an 
Author Kierkegaard makes clear the he does not want his own views confused with the views of 
his pseudonyms – this is the bedrock of his idea of “indirect communication.”  However, the 
hermeneutic problem of the pseudonyms within Kierkegaard scholarship is a massive project 
which we will not be able to take on here in this paper. However, it is worth noting that 
Kierkegaard identified most closely with his pseudonym Climacus, which he thought of as an 




other four books that I mentioned above.  I find this latter possibility to be less likely.  If it were 
to be a reference to one of the other four books I listed above, though, the most likely alternative 
would be Fear and Trembling. I will give more reasons for this claim later, but now I will 
discuss Concluding Unscientific Postscript and why I suspect that Roethke’s reference comes 
from this work. 
Concluding Unscientific Postscript is the text in which Kierkegaard-Climacus34 gives his 
most extensive discussion of the relationship among faith, reason, and the Divine.  More 
importantly, it is the text in which Kierkegaard most extensively develops his idea of the absurd 
and divinity within that context.  For this reason it seems likely that Roethke’s reference is drawn 
from here.  Kierkegaard-Climacus’ primary concern in Concluding Unscientific Postscript  is to 
polemically combat what he considers to be the existentially tranquilizing effects of 
Hegelianism.  Within this text his indictments of Hegelianism are manifold, but his primary 
concerns are that he thinks Hegel’s systematic philosophy promotes determinism and leveling.  
A deterministic culture is one in which the individuals within the society believe that they cannot 
enact control over their own lives, and thus live in hopeless despair over their perceived 
powerlessness. A leveled culture is one in which the dramatic distinctions between individuals 
are abnegated, and a homogenous, de-individuated society results.  As an existentialist, 
Kierkegaard is obviously deeply opposed to de-individuation and any force that works in its 
favor.  According to Kierkegaard-Climacus, Hegelianism’s totalizing systematicity works 
against stoking and provoking the passionate inner lives of the individual; Kierkegaard takes it as 
his task to rebut this desultory line of thinking, and instead to valorize passionate subjectivity, 
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especially as he believes that authentic passionate inwardness is a precondition of being an 
ethical self in the first place.  This valorization of passion leads to his discussion of faith.  For 
Kierkegaard, the state of possessing authentic faith is the state of being in which genuine 
subjective passion exists most clearly and intensely.  And critically, especially for the discussion 
of the concept of the “Divine Absurd,” the possession of such authentic faith depends on the 
existence of some element of absurdity.  Indeed faith, in the Kierkegaardian view, comes about 
precisely by virtue of the absurd. In Kierkegaard’s assessment of faith within the Christian 
context – which is the faith that he strived to possess - faith comes about by recognizing the 
paradox of God’s embodiment in Christ, and the choice to embrace this paradox.  Such faith is 
not the consequence of a reflective act of cognition; instead it is a complete and passionate 
existential commitment. Such faith is not measured by objective reliability, but is instead marked 
by that which repulses pure reason.  In his characteristically difficult style Kierkegaard describes 
paradox and faith as follows: 
But since the paradox is not in itself the paradox, it does not thrust away intensely 
enough, for without risk, no faith; the more risk, the more faith; the more objective 
reliability, the less inwardness (since inwardness is subjectivity); the less objective 
reliability, the deeper is the possible inwardness. When the paradox itself is the paradox, 
it thrusts away by virtue of the absurd, and the corresponding passion of inwardness is 
faith.35  
 
The now-popular concept of the “leap of faith” – which is often used in both secular and 
religious contexts to describe a passionate commitment to an uncertain outcome – originates in 
Kierkegaard’s descriptions of the nature of faith.  Even though Kierkegaard never actually used 
the exact term “leap of faith,” the phrase is a fitting distillation of his essential thoughts on the 
topic. Other historical figures have described faith in this way, although Kierkegaard’s fideistic 
                                                 




descriptions of faith are probably the most well-known in the context of post-Kantian western 
philosophy.36   
As mentioned, faith is the highest form of passion for Kierkegaard, and therefore 
represents the highest form of existential truth.  As Kierkegaard-Climacus says in Concluding 
Unscientific Postscript:  
Here is such a definition of truth: An objective uncertainty, held fast through 
appropriation with the most passionate inwardness, is the truth, the highest truth there is 
for an existing person. At the point where the road swings off (and where that is cannot 
be stated objectively, since it is precisely subjectivity), objective knowledge is 
suspended.37  
 
This is where the concept of the “Divine Absurd” that Roethke mentions in “Duet” comes into 
play.  While reflective society moves towards attempting to bring an element of certainty and 
knowledge to faith and the God-relationship, Kierkegaard does all that he can to resist this trend 
and to reclaim the requisite element of uncertainty in faith.  Here is just one of many passages in 
Concluding Unscientific Postscript that comes very close to saying “Divine Absurd” verbatim, 
which is the term Roethke used in “Duet.”  It seems most likely that Roethke’s reference to the 
“Divine Absurd” comes from passages such as this one in Concluding Unscientific Postscript, if 
not from this exact passage. 
“When Socrates believed that God is, he held fast the objective uncertainty with the 
entire passion of inwardness, and faith is precisely in this contradiction, in this risk. Now 
it is otherwise. Instead of the objective uncertainty, there is here the certainty that, viewed 
objectively, it is the absurd and this absurdity, held fast in the passion of inwardness, is 
faith. Compared with the earnestness of the absurd, the Socratic ignorance is like a witty 
jest, and compared with the strenuousness of faith, the Socratic existential inwardness 
                                                 
36 Historical antecedents include Tertullian.  Tertullian famously wrote “Credo quia absurdum” 
in De Carne Christi in the early 3rd century A.D. This phrase is most often translated as “I 
believe because it’s absurd.” Tertullian scholars have argued that this translation misrepresents 
Tertullian’s true thoughts about the nature of faith. But, as just mentioned, Kierkegaard’s 
fideistic arguments are among the most well-known today.   




resembles Greek nonchalance. What, then, is the absurd? The absurd is that the eternal 
truth has come into existence in time, that God has come into existence, has been born, 
has grown up, etc., has come into existence exactly as an individual human being, 
indistinguishable from any other human being…”38 
 
This last italicized line gives a concrete example of the idea of the “divine absurd,” although it 
need not be so concrete.  The principle idea when thinking of the Kierkegaardian idea of divine 
absurdity is that there must be some element of absurdity for faith to be genuine, and that 
passionate commitment – instead of intellectual knowledge – ought to be the standard for 
evaluating and thinking about faith. 
 I will now describe two more Kierkegaardian texts that Roethke seems to have 
knowledge of based on what he wrote in “Duet”: Fear and Trembling and The Concept of 
Anxiety.  After this description the thesis will turn towards an analysis of earlier Roethke poems, 
and will begin to analyze a broad array of existential themes as they appear in Roethke’s poetry 
and prose. 
 Lines 15-17 of “Duet” read: “I’m a roaring girl, an expensive wench,/ But at least we 
know one needn’t blench/ – In fear and trembling, dear Kierkegaard.” Here we find an explicit 
reference to Kierkegaard’s Fear and Trembling, a slim volume written in 1843 and published 
under the pseudonym Johannes de Silentio.  Fear and Trembling attempts to analyze the 
tumultuous psychological states that Abraham must have experienced after receiving his 
injunction by God to kill his son Isaac.39 In this way it is a work of speculative psychology, but 
also digs deep into the existential philosophy of religion. Roethke was clearly familiar with this 
book, even as early as 1948 or 1949.  In one of his notebook entries from this period of time 
                                                 
38 Ibid. 211/212.  Italics mine. 




Roethke wrote “We must have the courage, as Kierkegaard says, to think a thought whole.”40  I 
will discuss this quote in more detail in the third chapter of this paper when I will discuss 
“Paradox in the General Sense,” but for now I will just mention that this quote finds its origin in 
the first half of Kierkegaard’s Fear and Trembling.41  
In “Duet” Roethke plays on the serious-minded religious tone of Fear and Trembling by 
having the intensity of the book casually dismissed by an aesthetically minded character who 
describes herself as “a roaring girl” and an “expensive wench.”  The implication of the poem – at 
least as judged by its tone and superficial content – is that one need not worry about working out 
their faith in fear and trembling, especially if one is governed by the aesthetic drives and the 
pleasures of excess that come with being a roaring girl.42 To be living aesthetically in a 
Kierkegaardian sense is to live a life primarily motivated by the pursuit of pleasure.  If one is 
living aesthetically – motivated by money (line 2), beer, and so on – then one is less likely to 
spend time attending to their psychological health and spiritual wellbeing.  This idea is dealt with 
extensively by Kierkegaard, especially in Stages on Life’s Way in which he discusses three 
paradigmatic modes in which one can live one’s life: aesthetically, ethically, or religiously.  The 
aesthetically-minded individuals (like the “roaring girl”) never concerns themselves with faith 
(the religious) or universal questions of right and wrong (the ethical) because they are totally 
bound up in that which is sensuous and immediate (the aesthetic).  
                                                 
40 On Poetry and Craft 89 
41 The original quote, in translation, reads “For my own part I don't lack the courage to think a 
thought whole.” Fear and Trembling 34 
42 The book Fear and Trembling gets its title from Philippians 2:12, which in the KJV translation 
states “Wherefore, my beloved, as ye have always obeyed, not as in my presence only, but now 




One wonders how much Roethke identified himself with the “roaring girl” of “Duet,” for 
throughout his life Roethke repeatedly referred to himself as a “roarer.”  In 1952 Roethke even 
titled his book review of Dylan Thomas’ In Country Sleep and Other Poems “One Ring-Tailed 
Roarer to Another.”43 Thomas and Roethke had a well-documented friendship that involved 
excessive drinking and general debauchery.  In Kierkegaardian language this way of life would 
certainly be categorized as “aesthetic.” Roethke documents the character of their friendship – the 
extremities of their lifestyles and the intensities of their shared love for poetry - in his elegy to 
Dylan Thomas.44   
The above section demonstrates that Roethke certainly had a familiarity with Fear and 
Trembling, and it also suggests that Roethke may also have been familiar with Stages on Life’s 
Way. Although this latter point is speculative, it seems reasonable given that it has already been 
demonstrated that Roethke was familiar with several other texts by Kierkegaard. 
The last lines from “Duet” that I will consider in order to see what they can tell us about 
Roethke’s knowledge of the works of Kierkegaard are lines 24 and 25. These lines read “Should 
Dame Anxiety ever come near/ We’ll give each other a box on the ear.”  This final section of the 
poem continues the casually dismissive attitude that the prior passages displayed, but it also 
takes on an ironical attitude.  The two aesthetes – “he” and “she” – in the poem appear to be 
anxious about the possibility of anxiety appearing in their lives.  Thus, in the attempt to avoid 
anxiety, anxiety only presents itself more clearly to them. The line “We’ll give each other a box 
on the ear” suggests the idea that violence might be a solution (however limited in it’s success) 
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to the problem of anxiety insofar as it brings consciousness from contemplation of the infinite to 
acute awareness of that which is immediate and somatic.  
For Kierkegaard anxiety is a precondition for the possibility of becoming a self in the 
first place.  Phenomenologically speaking, for Kierkegaard anxiety presents itself to us as “the 
dizziness of freedom”; it moves us from a state of non-self-awareness towards a state of self-
awareness in which we can recognize the possibilities for living that are before us. Ultimately, 
this dizziness contains the potential to motivate us to make a choice on how to live; an existential 
lifestyle choice that serves as a point of focus to combat the disorienting dizziness of freedom.  
Choosing to deny that one possesses the capacity to make choices regarding their own life – an 
idea similar to what Sartre will later call “bad faith” – leads to alienation and despair.  As 
Kierkegaard says, “The self is freedom… The more consciousness, the more self; the more 
consciousness, the more will; the more will, the more self.”45  The two characters in “Duet” 
exemplify the despair of not choosing to be oneself; the despair of self-denial that Kierkegaard 
talks about in his book The Sickness Unto Death.  Roethke seems to be using the two characters 
“he” and “she” to exemplify this particular form of Kierkegaardian despair.  This despair that 
they exemplify – which was described a few sentences ago – is a form of despair that 
Kierkegaard, via the pseudonym Anti-Climacus, describes extensively in The Sickness Unto 
Death. Of this despair he says “This form of despair is: in despair not to will to be oneself. Or 
even lower: in despair not to will to be a self. Or lowest of all: in despair to will to be someone 
else, to wish for a new self.”46   
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Roethke’s use of the term “Dame Anxiety” here could very well be a reference to the 
discussions of anxiety, despair, and sin in The Sickness Unto Death.  However, the use of this 
specific term is more likely a reference to Kierkegaard’s book The Concept of Anxiety, which 
was written under the pseudonym Vigilius Haufniensis. It could, of course, also be a more 
general reference to Kierkegaard’s discussions of anxiety that cut across both books. The 
Concept of Anxiety was written as a companion piece to The Sickness Unto Death. The Concept 
of Anxiety intensively examples the psychological characteristics of anxiety, especially as it 
relates to the concepts of original sin and freedom.  In general terms – and as I have just 
mentioned before – in these texts anxiety is treated as precondition for an individual’s becoming 
an authentic self in the first place, and more significantly it is a precondition for one to be able to 
make an authentic, faith-filled commitment to God.  Roethke demonstrates a competence with 
these Kierkegaardian ideas, especially as the two characters in the poem ironically exemplify it, 
to the form of self-denying despair that they are both consciously attempting to avoid.   
The investigation of this poem has yielded an abundance of information about not only 
Roethke’s knowledge of Kierkegaard, but of his familiarity with the existential tradition more 
generally.  Both Heidegger and Unamuno have been identified as existential figures that Roethke 
likely makes oblique reference to in “Duet,” and it has been demonstrated that Roethke also 
displays an awareness of at least three different Kierkegaardian texts within this same poem. 
Now this thesis will turn towards an analysis of how Roethke’s poetry displays certain existential 
themes, and in particular themes that characterize Kierkegaard’s existential philosophy, such as 
death-consciousness, the generativity of paradox, passion versus reflection, death-in-life, and the 




2. THE EXISTENTIAL SPIRIT OF THEODORE ROETHKE’S POETRY AND 
PROSE 
 
In this section I will provide a survey of certain key existential themes as they appear in 
Roethke’s larger body of work; both found in his poetry and his non-poetic writings. This 
section, in keeping with the backwards-facing methodology, will examine writings composed 
well before “Duet.”  But before launching into this analysis, I will take a bit of time to challenge 
a mode of Roethke interpretation that has interfered with Roethke’s being viewed as an 
existentially-minded poet. 
As mentioned in the introductory section, there is a tendency in Roethke scholarship to 
interpret Roethke’s work through one of a handful of theoretical models. I take issue primarily 
with the psychoanalytic interpretations’ tendency to dissect and pathologize Roethke’s poetry to 
the point that it loses its passion and distinctiveness. All too often, the literature treats the content 
of Roethke’s poems as evidence to support a psychological evaluation and nothing more; a 
diagnosis, rather than literary interpretation, is the primary product of these investigations. Such 
psychoanalytic literature generally engages in a process of symbol-mining wherein Roethke 
scholars look for the term which represents “the father,” “the mother,” and so on. As I will soon 
show, Roethke was critical of this overly-simplistic mode of analysis. Notwithstanding, 
influential Roethke scholars such as Malkoff often make claims such as “The obvious sexual 
implications of such poems as 'Root Cellar' and 'Orchids' should alert the reader to the Freudian 
possibilities of the entire sequence. Roots, soil, and cellars in particular seem to provide a context 
for unconscious or prerational mental processes.”47  In these sorts of analyses, after identifying 
                                                 




the correct symbols, it is concluded that the task of understanding Roethke is complete.48 But the 
task of understanding Roethke’s poetry is far from complete here, and Roethke’s extensive 
reading of the existentialists attests to his poetic elusiveness and complex philosophical 
commitments. In Roethke’s work he not only grapples with his childhood and sexuality, but he 
also wrestles with fundamental existential problems relating the generation of meaning within 
the boundary-condition of human finitude, the relationship between growth and death, the 
fraught relationship between individuals and society, and the human-nature relationship. My task 
will not be to analyze what Roethke’s poems disclose about him as a psychological case-study, 
but instead to analyze what his poetry says about existence in the world.  
Roethke’s poetry maintains – among other things - that close observation of the plant 
world can induce a sense of wonder, and this wonder can generate passions and modes of 
experiencing that make one more engaged with the task of living. But the generative wonder 
induced by Roethke’s poetry was hard to come by in postwar America, and instead he saw 
society afflicted by a deep sense of existential languor.49 In an introduction to New World 
Writing in 1953 Roethke wrote: 
He (the ordinary reader) will not be afraid of feeling – and this in spite of the deep-rooted 
fear of emotion existing today, particularly among the half-alive, for whom emotion, 
even when incorporated into form, becomes a danger, a madness. Poetry is written for the 
whole man….50 
 
                                                 
48 “Mourning the Father-figure in Modern American Poetry” by Maria Regina Campbell, a 
dissertation written at the University of Ulster in 2010 is another example of this.  So is The 
Objective Ego by Stephen Spender. Even the appendix of The Glass House attempts to analyze 
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While he found his contemporaries to be trepidatious in the face of strong emotion, and 
therefore only experiencing a partial image of life (“half-alive”), Roethke, like Kierkegaard, 
wanted to magnify his and others’ engagement with the energy and intensity that strong emotions 
can bring about. This motivation to pursue the generation of strong emotions and passions in his 
poetry follows from his fundamental cosmological view of the world and his existential 
commitments to what it means to be human.  Instead of believing humans to be passive 
perceivers of sense-data – mere cogitos in a static grid-like world – Roethke’s cosmology held 
the world to be an active place characterized by and ongoing flux of energy and kinetic forces. 
When asked about why his poetry was characterized by an energetic rhythm, Roethke gave a 
response that described his fundamental vision of reality: “This may be because I see the world 
in motion.”51 Energy, as generated by sharp paradoxical lines or by intense imagery, is always 
driving Roethke’s poetry along, and, as with figures like William Blake, Roethke’s vision of the 
world and the form and content of his poetry are not unconnected. 
In general, this tendency to critique those who are afraid of passion and vitality permeates 
Roethke’s writing, both in his notebooks and in his poetry. The “half-alive” person seems to be 
the person who is overly concerned with self-diagnosis, or overly devoted to rationalistic 
understanding of existence, to the extent that they forget they have a choice in who they are and 
who they might become. Thus, in an odd paradox (one of many pedagogically useful paradoxes 
that I will examine in this thesis), the diagnosis Roethke pronounces upon his then-contemporary 
society is that those in it spent too much time in self-diagnoses and not enough time celebrating 
and affirming the energetic complexities of life. Roethke often lampooned the tendency of his 
contemporaries to interpret through this sort of diagnostic lens, which was at the time most often 
                                                 




a psychoanalytic lens. One particularly memorable moment of this lampooning can be found in 
his notebooks from approximately 1945 or 1946 (this particular entry was undated) when he says 
“Anything longer than it is wide is a male sexual symbol, say the Freudians.”52 It should not be 
surprising that Roethke was critical of the Freudians at this time, for there was a flood of 
Freudian literary criticism appearing at that time in postwar America. In 1945 Frederick J. 
Hoffman published Freudianism and the Literary Mind, an expansive book meant to 
demonstrate how Freud shaped the aesthetic taste of the 20th century. Frederick claims that a 
long list of a poets – including Dylan Thomas53 and Henry Miller – took and implemented ideas 
directly from Freud, and Hoffman even goes so far as to identify Kierkegaard as a precursor to 
Freudian thought. Around this time, many other psychoanalytic thinkers were coming to the fore 
of intellectual consciousness, including Joseph Campbell, Carl Jung, and Jacques Lacan, and in 
many ways dominated American literary intellectual life.  While Roethke was thoroughly versed 
in psychoanalytic language (it does not take long to find examples of him talking about the 
unconscious, repressions, transference, etc), he resisted the passive tone of much psychoanalytic 
work, and infused his writing with energy and life—a style more akin to Blake or Whitman than 
Jung or Freud. Resistance to this sort of intellectualist passivity permeates Roethke’s work, and 
in his own description of his work as a poet he made his claim about existential energy clear. 
Instead of perpetuating psychoanalytic approaches that attempt to render Roethke as a “mentally 
ill,” “manic,” or “repressed,” poet, I will focus on him as an existentialist poet of philosophical 
energy and dynamism. As Rita Felski might caution us against adopting a “hermeneutics of 
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suspicion,”54 Roethke’s poetry should not be understood as a reservoir of psychoanalytic 
symptoms lurking underneath the surfaces of his poems, but instead as a poet making a sincere 
attempt at expressing his interpretation of existence.  
As mentioned above, for Roethke the paramount merit of poetry is not perfect clinical 
self-understanding or perfect formal qualities, but is instead the generation of existential energy. 
One example of this can be found in his notebooks where he writes “Energy is the soul of 
poetry.”55 He also says “a poem means an extra, a surplus of energy.”56  In his view energy – 
which seems to nicely parallel Kierkegaard’s idea of passion – is the very bedrock of meaning 
for a poem.  For Kierkegaard without inward passion there is no self in the first place; for 
Roethke without energy there is no poem.  The poem must have some sort of force; a force that 
extends beyond mere formal perfection. Roethke makes this claim abundantly clear from an 
entry in one of his notebooks written somewhere between 1943 and 1947.  He writes: 
Movement: one of the hardest things a beginner (an honest one) has to learn is how to 
sustain the energy of a poem: in other words, the basic rhythm. He may have a variety of 
fresh subject matter, slick imagery, sharp epithets, but if he can’t make the words move, 
he has nothing.57 
 
Energy is at the center of Roethke’s life at work as poet. It is represented not only in his poems 
of growth and struggle, but it is even found in the formal qualities of his poems themselves.  I 
will focus more on the former – on his ontological attitudes towards growth, struggle, and 
vitality – but it is worth mentioning that a very good complete book has already been written 
about how the formal qualities of Roethke’s poems create and carry a sense of energy and 
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urgency: Richard Blessing’s 1974 book Theodore Roethke’s Dynamic Vision.  To give a quick 
sense of how he approaches Roethke’s poetic energy here is a passage from his opening chapter: 
My intention here is to demonstrate that a sense of the terrible and beautiful dynamism of 
life is with Roethke from his earliest preserved writings and, beyond that, to trace his 
artistic evolution of strategies adequate to translate that sense into language, into poetry.  
Mine is a study of style: of rhythm, rhyme, diction, verb forms, the use of pun, paradox, 
compression, repetition, and yes, even alliteration of initial sounds and manipulation and 
variation of interior words.58 
 
In this book Blessing deftly identifies some of the poetic techniques Roethke employs to give his 
poems a sense of energy and intensity.  He even located an enumerated list of teaching notes that 
Roethke titled “Devices for Heightening Intensity.” 
 1. Use of symbolism. Intense feeling is important, but it is not enough.  
     2. Use of simplicity: bald statement.  Monosyllables: movement and rush. 
     3. Repetition. 
      4. Use of constant antithesis, word against word, phrase against phrase. 
     5. Paradox: sense transfer. 
     6. Deliberate use of ambiguity (pun).59 
Many of these technical methods that Roethke employed to generate a sense of energy – 
especially his use of paradox – will turn out to be philosophically important.  However, 
interesting though this is, I will now display how Roethke’s pre-“Duet” poems exemplify a 
Kierkegaardian existential view of the self in the world. 
2.1 Kierkegaard and Roethke on the Energy of the Self 
In this section I will present an argument that claims that Kierkegaard and Roethke share 
similar visions of the self.  Naturally, since I am arguing that both of these thinkers share a 
similar existential view of existence, it will be of paramount importance to display that they have 
similar understandings of selfhood. First I will present an outline of Kierkegaard’s view of the 
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self, and then I will demonstrate how Roethke’s writings mirror Kierkegaard’s view of energetic 
selfhood.  
For Kierkegaard the self is essentially kinetic.  Instead of thinking of the self as a static 
entity, he views the self as the ongoing activity of self-relation.  In The Sickness Unto Death, via 
his pseudonym Anti-Climacus, Kierkegaard makes clear that the self is not a simple synthesis, as 
Hegel would have it, but is an ongoing clash between differing fundamental forces.60 The 
Kierkegaardian self should be thought of as a verb, not a noun.  This problematizes language 
insofar as the tradition, and the temptation, is to say “it,” “the self,” and so on, and in no case do 
these terms fully capture the sense of activity that Kierkegaard describes. As we will see in the 
upcoming passage, Kierkegaard describes “it” as the “relation’s relating.” Notwithstanding this 
issue of the limitations of language, self, in this Kierkegaardian context, ought to be thought in 
terms of energy, friction, and activity, and not as a stable or final entity.  To give a well-known 
and infamous Kierkegaardian definition of self, here is the opening passage of The Sickness Unto 
Death.  Notice how he strives, perhaps only somewhat successfully given that this passage is 
almost impenetrable, to describe how the self is a kinetic activity rather than some form of static 
entity: 
A human being is spirit. But what is spirit? Spirit is the self. But what is the self? The self 
is a relation that relates itself to itself or is the relation's relating itself to itself in the 
relation; the self is not the relation but is the relation's relating itself to itself. A human 
being is a synthesis of the infinite and the finite, of the temporal and the eternal, of 
freedom and necessity, in short, a synthesis. A synthesis is a relation between two. 
Considered in this way a human being is still not a self.... In the relation between two, the 
relation is the third as a negative unity, and the two relate to the relation and in the 
relation to the relation; thus under the qualification of the psychical the relation between 
the psychical and the physical is a relation. If, however, the relation relates itself to itself, 
this relation is the positive third, and this is the self.61 
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As shown in the above quote, some examples of the polarities that are always clashing against 
one another in Kierkegaardian ontology are finitude/infinitude, the temporal and the eternal, and 
possibility/necessity.62  If there is a misrelation in the activity between any of these polarities, 
then some form of despair will inevitably result. The details of these forms of despair need not be 
combed over in detail; this idea has already been discussed in some detail on page 20 in the 
discussion of the characters in “Duet.”  What is essential is that for Kierkegaard the self is 
constituted by some form of active energy, and in the absence of this activity then existential 
dangers appear. 
 Roethke’s poetry is also characterized by a similar idea of the self being constituted by 
energy and activity.  To demonstrate that Roethke recognized the importance of energy in self-
constitution we should – in keeping with the backwards-facing methodology that Kierkegaard 
promoted and Roethke praised – return to the beginnings of his poetic career and find an 
example of Roethke’s poetry that is characterized by yearning for or recognition of existential 
energy.  
In the introduction to her book The Garden Master Rosemary Sullivan says of Roethke 
“Those who knew him felt most his devouring energy, his over-need.”63  Roethke what aware of 
the sense of intensity that characterized his poetry and his person, and he infused his poetry with 
his emblematic intensity.64 This intense sense of energy is manifest even in his early poetry.  
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“Interlude” is the seventh poem in Open House (1941), Roethke’s first book.  This poem already 
suggests a need for activity, and in the absence of it a form of despair in the loss of hope results. 
 The element of air was out of hand. 
 The rush of wind ripped off the tender leaves 
 And flung them in confusion on the land. 
 We waited for the first rain in the eaves. 
 
 The chaos grew as hour by hour the light 
 Decreased beneath an undivided sky. 
 Our pupils widened with unnatural night, 
 But still the road and dusty field kept dry. 
 
 The rain stayed in its cloud; full dark came near; 
 The wind lay motionless in the long grass. 
 The veins within our hands betrayed our fear. 
 What we had hoped for had not come to pass.65 
 
This is a poem of anticipation and disappointment.  The narrator yearns for the storm to begin, 
for the clouds to open up and to release, for the concealed energy of the clouds to reveal itself.  
In that event the elemental unity between sky and earth would be achieved, and there would be 
an active relation between the two oppositional fields – earth and sky – that constrain, 
characterize, and give shape to our experience.66 But the narrator has no control over the 
elemental, or seems not to think that they do.  Because of this lack of agency the narrator assume 
a passive posture – an existential stasis – and waits. And in waiting ends up in disappointment 
and despair; the energy needed to overcome the existential stillness was not realized.  The 
narrator yearned for the energy that the storm-eruption would provide. However, since the 
poem’s narrator cannot bring about this energy for themselves, the implication is that they should 
lay claim to that which they can provide for themselves: inner energy.  This laying claim to inner 
energy is what Kierkegaard would call passion, and, as discussed, is the foundation for the 
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possibility of meaningful existence in the first place.  In “Interlude” Roethke uses a storm as a 
thought-image for visualizing passion and despair, activity and despair, and for conveying the 
loss of existential meaning that occurs in the absence of the former. 
 Sharon Ann Maselli, in her 1978 dissertation titled “’The Possibles We Dare’: Art and 
Identity in the Poetry of Theodore Roethke,” astutely points out that Roethke’s self is 
characterized by active becoming rather than stillness and finality.  She says of Roethke “There 
are intervals of intense illumination and knowing, but the self is a perpetual beginner, ever 
emerging, always at the edge of discovery. In Roethke's poetry, the final self is a supreme 
fiction.”67  And this is certainly true.  The irreconcilable tensions and contraries that characterize 
Roethke’s poetry mean that one is never “there,” so to speak, but is always only in the process of 
self-discovery and self-exploration. 
 The generative tension of contraries that vitalizes the ontologies of Blake (who I will 
discuss soon), Kierkegaard, and Roethke is also not lost on Sullivan.  In fact, she goes so far as 
to claim that this sense of self-constituting oppositionality became part of Roethke’s “set cast of 
mind.”68 The following quote from Sullivan nicely captures this idea.  “Ambiguity, the 
perception of both inner and outer reality as a series of opposites, seems to have become the set 
cast of his mind. ‘In my veins contraries skip.’ (Notebooks, reel 5, no. 69). The exacerbation of 
opposites, the swings in his poetry from ecstasy to despair, find their pattern here, as does his 
desire for reconciliation of opposites into some kind of unity.”69  Maselli also identifies that 
Roethke’s work is characterized by a sense of tension that is both fierce and fecund. “He brings 
to the tension between Yes and No, creation and destruction, affirmation and denial, a 
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contemporary, post-wasteland urgency. Roethke's psychic and physical landscapes are not 
barren; they are fertile, dark, creative.”70  
 This idea of identity as being constituted by opposing forces, yet still unified in some 
complex, paradoxical manner, is expressed by Roethke in a number of ways.  Roethke’s 
notebooks contain many instances in which he describes his identity as both a singular and as a 
multitude; as a complex, contradictory unity.  For example in his notebooks he writes “The self, 
the anti-self in dire embrace.”71 This striking image visualizes a paradox both physical and 
metaphysical: the things that are us and the things that are not us are unified in tension as if in the 
physicality of an embrace. Paradoxical claims and statements like this are fundamental to 
Roethke’s existential vision, which is a claim I will discuss extensively in the final chapter of 
this thesis. Soon after writing the paradoxical line about the self and the anti-self Roethke 
continues writing on this theme:   
With many myselves I stole away, 
Laden with leaves for money, 
My hair full of sticks and ferns.72 
 
To say “with many myselves” might strike many others as manifestly absurd, but in the context 
of Roethkean ontology such statements keep with his idea of the self being composed of various 
self-contradicting forces.  Again, Roethke’s self is not one thing, but is a plurality of forces, a 
matrix of energy that has multiple expressions.  
In the 1948 volume The Lost Son and Other Poems “A Field of Light” displays yet 
another clear and detailed example of this fundamental existential and ontological attitude.73 This 
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poem – outside of the title and two brief mentions within the body of the poem  – does not spend 
much of its time describing things that one might in a field; instead the poem relates a wide 
variety of entities that one might encounter out in nature more generally – clams, weeds, planks 
sunk in the sand – and then it crescendos towards a revelation and declaration about the nature of 
experience itself.  In this revelation Roethke’s narrator proclaims to have witnessed the 
“separateness of all things.” The concept of the field, which we find in the title, serves a vital 
metaphysical function in this poem, for the “field” is that which allows for diverse, and even 
oppositional entities, to be united in a single “field” of experience.  The narrator has an 
existential epiphany about all things being radically particular, but the narrator is always at the 
same time actively – kinetically – incorporating this radical ontological diversity into a singular 
(albeit fragmented) experience of reality. In a sort of reverse Parmenidean experience the 
narrator goes from experiencing the unification of the field of light to understanding the radical 
multiplicity of all things.  Although we should refrain from accepting this pronouncement of 
multiplicity to be final, for the one and the many exists in a kinetic dialectic relationship in 
Roethke’s poetry – at one moment all things are one, and at the next all things are separate.  If 
anything provides a wholeness to experience it is only this fundamental opposition.   
Here is the last section of “A Field of Light.” I have italicized what I take to be the 
critical lines: 
Listen, love, 
The fat lark sang in the field; 
I touched the ground, the ground warmed by the killdeer, 
The salt laughed and the stones; 
The ferns had their ways, and the pulsing lizards, 
And the new plants , still awkward in their soil, 
The lovely diminutives. 
I could watch! I could watch! 
I saw the separateness of all things! 




The weeds believed me, and the nesting birds. 
There were clouds making a rout of shapes crossing a windbreak 
 of cedars, 
And a bee shaking drops from a rain-soaked honeysuckle. 
The worms were delighted as wrens. 
And I walked, I walked through the light air; 
I moved with the morning. 
 
  The concept of the titular “field” names this possibility of unity and diversity.  The 
“field” is the possibility for all things to come together as difference, pushing and pulling against 
one in a state of unceasing tension in a dialectical manner.  
  I argue that this idea of the “field” corresponds to Kierkegaard’s description of “self” 
described above in the passage from The Sickness Unto Death. Kierkegaard’s self is a series of 
oppositional forces struggling to be brought together through a dynamic existential synthesis. 
Roethke’s self, as conveyed in “A Field of Light,” is the force that has the possibility to unite 
radically separate, distinct entities through a kinetic process. Moreover, I argue that Roethke and 
Kierkegaard think that balancing the relationships of opposites is what is needed to overcome 
despair.  Roethke’s narrator exultantly explains “My heart lifted up with the great grasses” upon 
the narrator’s realizing the fundamental separateness of all things.  The self-conscious realization 
that life is constituted by a plethora of fundamentally disunited forces and things names the 
possibility for relating to this fundamental fact of our being in the right way.  In his 
characteristically impenetrable way, in The Sickness Unto Death Kierkegaard describes how 
despair is overcome given the fact that humans are beings composed of oppositional drives and 
forces: “The formula that describes the state of the self when despair is completely rooted out is 
this: in relating itself to itself and in willing to be oneself, the self rests transparently in the power 
that established it.”74 And soon thereafter: “Despair is the misrelation in the relation of a 
                                                 




synthesis that relates itself to itself. But the synthesis is not the misrelation; it is merely the 
possibility, or in the synthesis lies the possibility of the misrelation.”75 Essentially what 
Kierkegaard’s Anti-Climacus is saying here is that to elude despair we must first recognize what 
kind of being that we are – beings characterized by both internal and external disunity – and then 
will to be the kind of being that we are. We must abide in a “transparent” relation to the force76 
that established us as beings characterized by opposition and separateness.  As these selections 
display, it is clear that both Roethke and Kierkegaard recognize the “separateness” of all things, 
and that they recognize that recognizing this separateness – and possessing a willingness to live 
with it – is critical to the avoidance of despair. We must recognize and accept the oppositional 
forces within us, perhaps in a backwards-facing stance of self-understanding, and only then 
move forward. 
  “A Field of Light” also seems to very nicely align with Heidegger’s concept of the 
“Clearing” which Heidegger outlines in “The Origin of the Work of Art.” This alignment is 
especially clear given that Heidegger uses a language of illumination similar to the one that 
Roethke employs in this poem. The “field of light” in Roethke’s poem could easily be confused 
with Heidegger’s illuminated “clearing of being.”  For example, see this quote from “The Origin 
of the Work of Art” for comparative purposes: “In the midst of being as a whole an open place 
occurs. There is a clearing, a lighting. Thought of in reference to what is, to beings, this clearing 
is in a greater degree than are beings. This open center is therefore not surrounded by what is; 
rather, the lighting center itself encircles all that is, like the Nothing which we scarcely know. 
That which is can only be, as a being, if it stands within and stands out within what is lighted in 
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this clearing. Only this clearing grants and guarantees to us humans a passage to those beings 
that we ourselves are not, and access to the being that we ourselves are.”77 This last line by 
Heidegger especially parallels the way that Roethke describes the field of light.  Roethke’s field 
of light is that which allows the elusive particulars of life to reveal themselves as they are; 
Heidegger’s clearing is the way in which the beings in Being reveal themselves as they are. 
Roethke almost certainly did not get this precise terminology directly from this particular 
Heideggerian essay, especially since this essay by Heidegger was published in 1950, a full two 
years after The Lost Son and Other Poems was published. However, especially in light of my 
earlier commentary on “Duet,” it is certainly a possibility that Roethke was also influenced by 
the early Heidegger’s conception of truth and being. In 1927 Heidegger published his magnum 
opus Being and Time, which Roethke was likely familiar with given this book’s major impact 
and Roethke’s expressed interest in philosophies of existence.  In Being and Time Heidegger 
repeatedly and emphatically describes the truth of being in terms of “unconcealedness” or 
aletheia.78 The disclosure of truth as aletheia requires some level of illumination, and Roethke’s 
“Field” gives a poetic demonstration of the illumination of being in the experience of aletheia 
that the poetic narrator undergoes.  The narrator’s epiphantic exclamation “I could watch!” is the 
climactic exclamation of this realization; it is the announcement that that which had formerly 
been concealed is now unconcealed. 
Much more could be said about this, but in consideration of time and length we should 
now turn to a consideration of how Roethke conveys a sense of vital existential energy in his 
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poems, and how he uses a specific form of natural imagery to convey his fundamental existential 
sensibility. 
 
2.2 Nature, Kierkegaard, Blake, and Other Teachers of Vitality 
 
 In this section I will discuss how Roethke employs natural imagery as a method to 
convey his vitalistic existential commitments.  Roethke, along with Kierkegaard, William Blake, 
and Friedrich Nietzsche, each possessed an acute sense of death-consciousness.  However, for 
them, awareness of one’s own mortality was not a desultory realization, but instead served as 
realization that was also a reminder; it was a reminder to intensify their engagement with the task 
of living.  Such a realization is fecund, productive, but how can such an existential realization be 
conveyed poetically?   
I argue – and this in contrast to most previous interpreters79 – that Roethke’s use of 
“nature” should be thought of as a pedagogical force that advances a particular mode of 
existential understanding. Roethke’s nature is a teacher of vitality, as I have said, and by thinking 
about nature’s obdurate insistence on its own growth and promulgation we can learn for 
ourselves how to grow and push ourselves through our own lives. Roethke’s vitalism advances in 
the tradition of Nietzsche, Blake, and Kierkegaard, but I think that Roethke’s vitalism can be 
more closely identified with the latter two figures. Each of these three figures see life as a 
process of reconciling and overcoming opposites. However, it is Blake and Kierkegaard who 
(and this is crucial for Roethke) identify the source of the possibility of this overcoming with a 
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supernatural Other.80 Roethke, too, held to a similar vision of vitality, identifying life always as 
an energetic interaction of certain recurring opposites such as growth/decay, light/dark, and 
past/future. Indeed, as mentioned in the first section, Roethke approvingly cites Kierkegaard’s 
well-known quote, “Life can only be understood backwards; but it must be lived forwards,” 
which describes life as a clash of past and future. He also explicitly refers to Blake by name 
within his poetry, and he refers to him in a way that discloses some of his mystical, existential, 
and vitalistic commitments.  In “Once More, The Round,” which happens to be Roethke’s last 
poem in his last published book of poetry The Far Field81, which was also published around the 
same time that Roethke wrote his poem about Kierkegaard, Roethke writes about Blake, vitality, 
and the unity of contraries.82  What follows is the poem in full: 
 What’s greater, Pebble or Pond? 
 What can be known? The Unknown. 
 My true self runs toward a hill 
 More! O more! Visible. 
 
 Now I adore my life 
 With the Bird, the abiding Leaf 
 With the Fish, the questing Snail, 
 And the Eye altering all; 
 And I dance with William Blake 
 For love, For Love’s sake; 
 
 And everything comes to One, 
 And we dance on, dance on, dance on.83 
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In this poem Roethke identifies Blake as a force of reconciliation and overcoming. We 
see the narrator dancing about in a state of mystical ekstasis. The narrator has been energized and 
vitalized by a recognition and embrace (“Now I adore my life”) of the contraries 
(“known”/”Unknown”) that cut through the heart of existence, and that give existence its 
fundamentally tense character. Love, in this poem, is the force that embraces the contraries, and 
that chooses to affirm the unknown and the other.  Instead of developing a hierarchy – “What’s 
greater, Pebble or Pond?” – the narrator instead chooses to accept a paradoxical unity that is 
characterized by diversity, a sense of oneness that defies cognitive limitations and ontological 
difference.  The existential embrace of total affirmation overcomes these otherwise 
discontinuous features of existence. 
 Related to this, and in order to clarify how Roethke fits into the vitalistic existential 
tradition, I argue that it is more accurate to understanding Roethke’s vitalism as closer to 
Kierkegaard’s “infinite passion” than in terms of Nietzsche’s “will to power.” Of many reasons, 
the primary reason that I argue this is because Kierkegaard identifies the passionate inward drive 
growth as being motivated, at least in its ideal form, by the existence of a divine force, whereas 
Nietzsche’s secular eschatological vision is without such an external power. Moreover, and as a 
more simple proof, Roethke refers to Kierkegaard more frequently than he refers to Nietzsche, 
differentiating him from Nietzsche-inspired poets interested in nature and vitality, including 
Rainer Maria Rilke, Wallace Stevens, and W.B. Yeats. 
Nature is used by Roethke as a thought-image for vitality, and nature is usually 
exemplified by Roethke in the form of a plant. The plants that frequently appear in his poems 
struggle for life through the decaying bodies of previous generations, always striving for life in 




humanizing language. Emblematic of this is the first four lines of “Cuttings (later),” the second 
poem of The Lost Son: 
This urge, wrestle, resurrection of dry sticks, 
Cut stems struggling to put down feet, 
What saint strained so much, 
Rose on such lopped limbs to a new life? 
 
For Roethke, this fecundity in the midst of death is a model that human beings should strive to 
imitate and to internalize as an accurate, therapeutic, and perhaps even beatific (“What saint 
strained so much”) model for human life. Indeed, a strong notion of life undergirds his poetry, 
and expressions of life in all forms (though primarily vegetal expressions of life) are continually 
heralded as sources of inspiration and motivation.  These vegetal thought-images mirror how it is 
that humans experience growth and decay in their inner lives. A radically affirmative sensibility 
subtends much of his thinking on this, and this radical affirmative sensibility extends beyond his 
writing as mentioned in the Rosemary Sullivan quote above.  Roethke’s childhood growing up in 
his father’s greenhouse provided him with the images of life-in-death and death-into-life that he 
displayed in his poetry.  The plant-world’s ability to surge through death and endure through 
adversity inspired his existential thinking about life-in-death.  In remembering these formative 
years in the greenhouses of his youth Roethke writes “For death into life was the rhythm of the 
greenhouses.”84  Roethke’s witnessed a vegetal realm in which death and decay were always 
related to growth and vigor.  From composting and fertilization to pruning, winter dormancy, and 
grafting, there is a way in which plants turn that which seems like death into something which 
promotes life and growth.  
                                                 




Roethke’s poetry continually expresses two themes that are consonant with his existential 
sense of life. First, life is always occurring in the midst of death. Second, this ineradicable death-
presence should be an inspiration rather that a depressant. Emblematic of this latter point, in 
“The Dying Man” Roethke writes: 
 Places great with their dead, 
 The mire, the sodden wood, 
 Remind me to stay alive.85 
I take these lines to emblematic of his existentialist commitment to the affirmation of life-in-
death. This poem – which is in the tradition of elegy poems, a genre associated in modernism 
with W.B. Yeats’s elegies and with poems responding to Yeats’s own death – stands in marked 
contrast to the desultory tone that other poems in this tradition maintained. This desultory 
tendency is clearly displayed in W.H. Auden’s elegy to Yeats. “In Memory of W.B. Yeats” by 
Auden baldly states Auden’s feelings in relation to death, especially in the last two lines, both of 
which I have italicized.  Here is the most telling passage from this elegy: 
But in the importance and noise of to-morrow 
When the brokers are roaring like beasts on the floor of the 
     Bourse, 
And the poor have the sufferings to which they are fairly 
     accustomed, 
And each in the cell of himself is almost convinced of his 
     freedom, 
A few thousand will think of this day 
As one thinks of a day when one did something slightly unusual. 
What instruments we have agree 
The day of his death was a dark cold day. 
                                                 




Where Auden sees only death and bleakness, Roethke sees life anew.  Roethke’s disposition is to 
recognize the vital fecundity in things, and the tendency of nature to grow beautifully out of 
moribund conditions. 
Roethke’s tendency to find life as always appearing in a context of death and decay is 
critical to his existential sensibility, but is not the only way in which Roethke works within the 
existential tradition. Roethke employs nature both as a reminder of why one should live 
affirmatively and also as a teacher that explains descriptively how to do so.  And further, I 
contend, Roethke’s vegetal imagery embodies a particularly Kierkegaardian mode of 
existentialism.  
2.3 The Conatus of the Plant 
Before turning to Kierkegaard’s thoughts on the death-life relation, and explaining how 
they relate to Roethke’s, I will make a brief – but hopefully helpful – foray into the early modern 
philosophical concept of the conatus, especially as described by Spinoza. I will do this because 
throughout Roethke’s vegetal poetry Roethke seems to existentially identify with the conatus 
exemplified by the plant.  
The concept of conatus was extensively theorized by 17th century philosophers Gottfriend 
Leibniz and Baruch Spinoza. Essentially, conatus describes the innate nature of a thing’s will to 
exist and improve itself. In Ethics part III Spinoza outlines what is commonly referred to as his 
“conatus doctrine,” which he introduces in propositions 6, 7 and 8 of Ethics III. Each proposition 
by Spinoza is followed by a “Demonstration,” but for the sake of brevity, I will not include the 
demonstrations here. What follows are propositions 6, 7 and 8 from Spinoza’s Ethics III, which 
are often referred to collectively as the “conatus doctrine.” 




P7: The striving by which each thing strives to persevere in its being is nothing but the 
actual essence of the thing. 
P8: The striving by which each thing strives to persevere in its being involves no finite  
time, but an indefinite time.86 
 
The conatus is each thing’s striving for its perseverance in life.  This idea of each thing 
possessing an inherent will to persevere in its own being seems to be at the heart of many of 
Roethke’s poems, and the language of life’s persistent striving permeates the larger body of 
Roethke’s poetry.  However, there is not much support to claim that Roethke was explicitly 
familiar with this doctrine.  Nevertheless, this idea seems to have found its way into Roethke’s 
life-affirming poetry, most likely through the tremendous influence that this doctrine has had on 
the subsequent writing of philosophy, and on the philosophers that specifically influenced 
Roethke.  Kierkegaard himself discussed this doctrine of the conatus, and argued that it is “no 
doubt correct.”87  
In all things Roethke sees life and an attendant striving for existence, and not just in those 
kinds of things that are typically thought of as “living.”  In Roethke’s poetry all manner of beings 
– from rocks and grass to hills and plants – sing and dance as if they are besouled beings in a 
Spinozistic panpsychical vision of existence.88  But this idea that Roethke ascribed to such a 
panpsychical vision of existence is not mere speculation.  In fact, Roethke makes a claim that 
world is panpsychical and universally vitalized in “On Identity” where he says “If the dead can 
come to our aid in a quest for identity so can the living—and I mean all living things, including 
                                                 
86 Spinoza’s Collected Works 498 and 499 
87 Kierkegaard’s Journals and Notebooks 2, JJ:443 
88 “Panpsychism” is the term used to refer to the idea that all of reality – and all beings therein – 
is infused with a mind or soul-like quality.  Muthanna Makki Muhammed very briefly makes the 
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the sub-human .... Everything that lives is holy: I call upon these holy forms of life.”89 Roethke 
also expresses this view poetically.  Just one of the multitudinous examples of this sensibility 
being expressed poetically can be found in Roethke’s poem “Her Becoming.” Typically in 
Roethke’s poems it is some form of vegetation that is rendered in vitalistic language, but in this 
poem it is the earth and ground itself that is alive and singing along with the narrator. 
 I see a shape, lighted with love, 
 Light as a petal falling upon stone. 
 From the folds of my skin, I sing, 
 The air still, the ground alive, 
 The earth itself a tune.90 
 
This poem exhibits the typical vitalism of Roethke’s poetry, and goes beyond his typical vegetal 
imagery to make the earth as such a living entity.  
One could almost confuse this poem for one of Whitman’s, and one would be well-
justified in experiencing this confusion. Whitman was a poetic inspiration for Roethke, and, 
more importantly, his work taught Roethke about the importance of vitality in poetry. In fact, 
Roethke explicitly used the idea of “vitality” when describing his understanding of Whitman.  
One example of Roethke describing Whitman in terms of vitalism comes all the way from 
Roethke’s early years as an undergraduate student at the University of Michigan at Ann Arbor.  
During his undergraduate studies there he took a course in American Literature, during which 
time he studied Whitman.  His notebooks from that time are still preserved, and they give great 
insight into his thoughts on vitality in general, and on Whitman’s vitalism in particular. His 
comments on Whitman are almost exactly what should be expected, especially after my claims 
about Roethke and his tendency to find a vital energy permeating all things.  In his notebooks 
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Roethke identifies Whitman as a poet who possesses the same sort of existential sensibility as 
himself, and his comments on Whitman give great insight into some of Roethke’s poems, 
especially poems like the aforementioned “Her Becoming.” What follows is a key passage from 
Roethke’s undergraduate notebook in which he lists some key ideas that he derived from 
Whitman. 
What are we to say of Whitman as a poet? Selection? Defied rules. Can great art be 
formless NO! 
1) An undying energy of life – a tang – vitalizing something. 
2) A certain largeness – deals with deep things on a large scale. 
3) Most great poetry is primal?91 
 
There is much to be learned in this passage from Roethke’s early notebooks, but most 
important of all is Roethke’s explicit articulation of an “undying energy of life” and of a 
“vitalizing something” that he identified in Whitman.   Whitman, along with the plant-world, 
served as teachers that instructed Roethke in his thinking about existential vitality, and their 
influence certainly shaped his poetic expressions and poetic imagery.   
“Her Becoming,” the poem most recently discussed, is a bit atypical for Roethke in that 
he uses the “earth itself” for his subject matter in this poem: “The air still, the ground alive/ The 
earth itself a tune.” Roethke typically praises the plant in particular as the kind of being that can 
educate both him and us in the art of living and growing; living and growing even in the midst of 
the vicissitudes and limitations of our being. Existentialists generally argue that these limitations 
and struggles we find ourselves always surrounded by, as in the “fetor of weeds” that Roethke 
discusses in “Weed Puller,” are fundamental to human life and the meaning of the existence.  It 
is in Roethke’s tendency to find life and vigor in these earthy depths and amid nature’s 
immutable limitations that his existential thinking is most apparent, although of course there is 
                                                 




more than just this tendency that aligns Roethke with this tradition.  Two more poems that are 
essential to further support this claim about Roethke’s existential tendency towards life-in-death 
are “Long Live the Weeds” and “Weed Puller.”  Both of these poems praise vegetal life’s 
struggling ability to live and grow in the muck and the dirt, and both suggest that we ought to be 
inspired by the model of vitality that they display.  Here is his early short poem “Long Live the 
Weeds” in full.  I have italicized the two lines that I take to be most critical towards supporting 
my claim. 
 Long live the weeds that overwhelm 
 My narrow vegetable realm! 
 The bitter rock, the barren soil 
 That force the son of man to toil; 
 All things unholy, marred by curse, 
 The ugly of the universe. 
 The rough, the wicked, and the wild 
 That keep the spirit undefiled. 
 With these I match my little wit 
 And earn the right to stand or sit, 
 Hope, love, create, or drink and die: 
 These shape the creature that is I.92 
 
In this poem “the ugly of the universe,” as exemplified in the microcosm of the garden, is also 
that which at the same time allows for the “spirit” to be “undefiled.”  Instead of lamenting the 
“bitter rock” or the weeds in the garden he praises them as a precondition for spiritual 
purification.  The muck and the dirt, barren by dint of the Adamic curse, is always still the source 
of life.  We, like weeds, grow as if from the dirt, and inevitably return to it – but in focusing on 
this tension which characterizes our lives, this tension which is simultaneously fecund and 
moribund, we can gain a clearer image of who we are and gain an animated sense of how we 
ought to live. 
                                                 




 The narrator of “Weed Puller” discovers his own vitality while in the middle of a grave-
like “fetor of weeds.”   
 With everything blooming above me, 
 Lilies, pale-pink cyclamen, roses, 
 Whole fields lovely and inviolate, -- 
 Me down in that fetor of weeds, 
 Crawling on all fours, 
 Alive, in a slippery grave.93 
Once again in this poem we find a narrator who comes alive – who comes to recognize his own 
vitality – only upon finding himself in the midst of the murky, struggling, striving world of the 
vegetal.  In the midst of the weeds Roethke’s narrators discover a sense of inspiration and 
vitalization, and this because the struggling conatus exemplified by plant-life serves as a 
pedagogical tool that teaches us how to take an existential grip on our own life even in the midst 
of our own mortality.  For, as the plants demonstrate, life and death are inexorably entwined. 
2.4 Kierkegaard on Life-in-Death 
 Now I will turn to a discussion of how Kierkegaard thought of life-in-death, and how 
Kierkegaard – like Roethke – recognized that it is by recognizing our own finitude and mortality 
that we can gain a new sense of inspiration and vitality.  I will take most of my inspiration for 
this claim from Kierkegaard’s discourse titled “At a Graveside.”94  
 “At a Graveside” is an understudied work.  It is a text that was written in Kierkegaard’s 
own voice95 as one within a collection of three “upbuilding” discourses. This particular discourse 
most clearly captures Kierkegaard’s thoughts about the relationship between death and life, and 
                                                 
93Ibid. 37 (emphasis added) 
94 It is worth noting that Heidegger likely got many of his now-famous ideas about Dasein as 
“Being-Towards-Death” from this particular Kierkegaardian discourse. 
95 Kierkegaard often used pseudonyms as a form of indirect communication; as a way to achieve 





it demonstrates that Kierkegaard’s view of life-in-death anticipates Roethke’s own view.  
Kierkegaard, along with a wide range of other, later existential thinkers, thought that the 
recognition of death in general and of one’s own mortality in particular should not be a desultory 
recognition, but instead that this recognition should serve as a reminder to stay alive and to 
intensify our engagement with the task of living.  This line of thinking has already been 
discussed extensively, but its importance cannot be overstated, and accordingly we will tarry 
along these lines a bit longer.   
Contemplating the importance that thinking about death can serve to those who are still 
living is a central undertaking in existential thought, and given that Kierkegaard is often called 
the “father of existentialism” it is unsurprising that he thought about life-in-death intensely and 
regularly, and perhaps most intensely in “At a Graveside.”  In “At a Graveside” Kierkegaard 
discussed the phenomenon of being at a cemetery, along with the internal psychological 
processes that one experiences when thinking and talking about death.  In this particular 
discourse Kierkegaard writes extensively about God, despair, and the contradiction of finitude 
and infinitude.  But, for the sake of this inquiry, the most important aspect of this discourse is 
that he describes the earnest recognition of death as a precondition for the possibility of earnest, 
engaged living in the world. I will select a few passages from this discourse that clearly convey 
this idea. It should be noted that when Kierkegaard uses the word “earnest” – which he does 
regularly in “At a Graveside” – his use of this word can be thought of as roughly synonymous 
with the words “intense” or “sincere.”  “Earnest” is meant to evoke a sense of active, 
participatory engagement.  The first instance in which we see Kierkegaard claim that the 
presence and awareness of one’s own imminent death can lead to an intensified engagement with 




earnestness… Death can expressly teach that truth lies in the inner being.”96  Here Kierkegaard 
unites death with education; he speaks of death as if it is the kind of thing that can motivate us to 
live. Moreover, the earnest thought of death forces us to recognize that we must live out own 
lives independently, not vicariously.  This aptly parallels Roethke’s earlier passages in which his 
poetic narrators describe discovering life and vitality from struggling subterreanean, mortal 
world of vegetation. Recognizing this mortal world invigorates the living world. Later, and in a 
similar but more detailed line of thought – and one that more directly describes death as a teacher 
–  Kierkegaard states: 
Death is the schoolmaster of earnestness, but in turn its earnest instruction is recognized 
precisely by its leaving to the single individual the task of searching himself so it can then 
teach him earnestness as it can be learned only by the person himself.97  
 
This is a very rich passage, and in a profound sense it gets to the heart of Kierkegaard’s 
existentialism.  Most importantly for us, though, is that it demonstrates that Kierkegaard thought 
that the earnest recognition of death is the kind of recognition that teaches us to live with greater 
intensity, individual engagement, and existential energy. When we think of death, when we 
experience it indirectly through the deaths of others, this thinking reminds us that we ourselves 
still have to live and find our own way.  This thinking delivers a reminder that is rarely given to 
the living, but when it is given it is transformative.  We see this sort of existential transformation 
acted out in life by people who decide to work on “checking off their bucket list” after the death 
of a close friend or loved one.  Or we see it acted out by those who choose to go “all in” with 
their remaining time after they have received some form of terminal diagnosis.  Reminders of 
death can paradoxically invigorate. 
                                                 





As discussed, Kierkegaard connected the presence of death with vitalization of life, and 
this way of thinking worked its way into the foundation of existential thought.  This viewpoint 
was later most famously rearticulated by Heidegger in his discussion of Being-towards-death.  I 
think there is a very strong case for believing that this way of thinking about death-in-life 
eventually found its way into Roethke’s writing through a path of thought that Kierkegaard 
initiated and promulgated in his writings. 
 This section has demonstrated that Roethke held similar views to Kierkegaard and other 
existentially and vitalistically-minded thinkers, that Roethke’s vision of life is one of striving and 
overcoming, and that he thinks that the plant serves a good model for this invigorated vision of 
life.  Now I will turn to the final section of this thesis in which I will give a more detailed 
















3. KIERKEGAARD AND ROETHKE ON PARADOX AND PEDAGOGY: A SUMMARY 
 
In this section I will make the connection between Roethke and Kierkegaard on a topic 
that is of critical importance to both of them: paradox.  The idea that paradox is a force of 
existential individuation and education is a critical idea shared by both thinkers, and one that is at 
the center of both of their existential thought. In Roethke and Kierkegaard’s writings we can find 
paradox discussed in at least two different contexts.  In the first context paradox serves the 
general purpose of helping individuals come to an understanding of who they are; it is an 
existential intensifier and force of individuation.  In the second context paradox serves as a 
model for pedagogical relations in the classroom.  This latter use of paradox overturns the 
traditional binary of the teacher as the active dispenser of knowledge and the student as the 
passive receiver of knowledge. Both uses of the concept of paradox are closely related, however 
I think that there is a subtle – and hopefully informative – distinction to be made between these 
two uses of paradox. 
3.1 The First Sense: Paradox as a Force of Existential Individuation 
 Roethke’s thought regarding the existential value of paradox was inspired by 
Kierkegaard’s thoughts on paradox.  Concrete proof of this can be traced to Roethke’s 
notebooks, and Roethke’s employment of paradox as an existentially relevant poetic tool also 
appears throughout his poetry.  Initially I will give some evidence that can be found in Roethke’s 
notebooks and aphoristic essays to prove that Roethke appropriated Kierkegaard ideas about 




 In a notebook entry from sometime between 1954 and 1958 Roethke directly declares a 
Kierkegaardian aphorism.  He writes “All knowledge lives in paradox.”9899  This aphorism, 
which is essentially a distillation of a key Kierkegaardian concept, is echoed in a more direct 
way in Roethke’s collection of aphorisms titled “Words For Young Writers.”  In this second 
aphorism Roethke mentions Kierkegaard directly when he says “We must have the courage, as 
Kierkegaard says, to think a thought whole.”100 The first aphorism seems to be a reference to 
Kierkegaard’s discussion of paradox in his Philosophical Fragments, which I will discuss 
momentarily. The second quotation is taken from a line in Fear and Trembling in which 
Kierkegaard (via his pseudonym Johannes de Silentio) discusses the paradox of Abraham being 
commanded by the all-perfect God to perform an ostensibly unethical act.  More specifically, this 
line references when God commanded Abraham to take his son, Isaac, and kill him atop Mt. 
Moriah.   
 Philosophical Fragments contains a significant portion of Kierkegaard’s thoughts (via the 
pseudonym Johannes Climacus) on the nature and function of paradox.  The discussion circles 
primarily around the topic of faith, and it contains multiple chapters devoted to the role that 
paradox plays in faith, and describes faith as clashing with reason.  In Kierkegaard’s thinking the 
ultimate truth – the highest stage of being – is authentic Christian faith.  Paradoxically, however, 
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Kierkegaard claims that this truth – the actuality of this kind of ultimate faith – comes about by 
virtue of the absurd. This idea of faith “by virtue of the absurd” appears over and again in 
Kierkegaard’s body of works, such as in Concluding Unscientific Postscript, Fear and 
Trembling, and Philosophical Fragments, and is why Kierkegaard is often described as a 
fideistic thinker, or as someone who thinks that faith and reason are fundamentally opposed to 
one another.  Kierkegaard repeats the idea that in order to have the truth of faith there must 
necessarily exist some uncertainty.  Reason, which we often confuse for being the only kind of 
knowledge, often disrupts our ability to experience other forms of truth, such as existential or 
religious truth.101  For Kierkegaard, the existence of paradoxes – such as God requiring evil to be 
done or knowledge of God requiring imperfect knowledge about him –  require us to leap out as 
singular beings and to existentially commit to some life-path.  We must make this leap or 
commitment even if we do not have an epistemically verifiable reason for doing so, for we are 
not given a pre-set path in life; we must always choose for ourselves how live.  Here are some 
representative quotes from Kierkegaard on this topic of paradox that come very close to 
Roethke’s first line “All knowledge lives in paradox.”   
However, one should not think slightly of the paradoxical; for the paradox is the source 
of the thinker’s passion, and the thinker without a paradox is like a lover without feeling: 
a paltry mediocrity… The supreme paradox of all thought is the attempt to discover 
something that thought cannot think.102 
 
Here Kierkegaard describes a thinker’s passion as resulting from the existence of paradox, and 
he paradoxically portrays uncertainty as a facet of the human condition that is at once limiting 
but also upbuilding.  As Kierkegaard says in the last line, attempting to think the unthinkable and 
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to know the unknowable is described as a supremely invigorating activity.  The unthinkable 
reveals much about our condition and limitations; the thinking of the unthinkable corresponds to 
the ultimate passion and the authentic experience of faith. Both are intrinsically related.  In 
attempting to know the unknowable the poignant existential necessity of faith reveals itself. 
As mentioned earlier in my section on Concluding Unscientific Postscript Kierkegaard 
thinks of truth as roughly equivalent to subjectivity and passion.  Therefore that which produces 
a great deal of subjective passion (in this case paradox) is that which is existentially invigorating 
and truth-making.  Kierkegaard describes unknowability as fundamental to human experience, 
but also considers reason to be a fundamental force that moves us through life, too.  Because of 
this there is also a paradoxical double-movement in life in which we attempt to know the 
unknowable.  Reason asks the impossible of us, yet we persist in the impossible attempt, and 
believing the impossible can be supremely invigorating. 
 In this next passage from Philosophical Fragments Kierkegaard describes the nature and 
dynamics of a particular experience of paradox. 
How should the Reason be able to understand what is absolutely different from itself? If 
this is not immediately evident, it will become clearer in the light of the consequences; 
for if the God is absolutely unlike man, then man is absolutely unlike the God; but how 
could the Reason be expected to understand this? Here we seem to be confronted with a 
paradox. Merely to obtain the knowledge that the God is unlike him, man needs the help 
of the God; and now he learns that the God is absolutely different from himself. But if the 
God and man are absolutely different, this cannot be accounted for on the basis of what 
man derives from the God, for in so far they are akin. Their unlikeness must therefore be 
explained by what man derives from himself, or by what he has brought upon his own 
head.103 
 
This passage describes the nature of the “absolute paradox,” which Roethke equates with the 
Christian idea of the incarnation.  This is the doctrine that God became fully man in the person of 
                                                 




Jesus Christ.  Kierkegaard contends that this idea is impossible to think since God and man are 
fundamentally unlike one another, and it would imply a contradiction for two fundamentally 
dissimilar entities to be reconciled into the same being – Jesus Christ.  However, Kierkegaard 
also contends that this paradox is necessary and fundamental to what he considers to be the 
existential truth of Christian faith.  The impossibility of the claim –  metaphysically, rationally, 
and otherwise –  is that which infuses it with existential significance in the first place. 
 The second aphorism in which Roethke quotes Kierkegaard comes from a passage in 
Fear and Trembling in which Kierkegaard discusses a different paradox.  Roethke states “We 
must have the courage, as Kierkegaard says, to think a thought whole.”104  The original text that 
this passage refers to is a section of Fear and Trembling in which Kierkegaard, as alluded to 
earlier, is struggling with the story of Abraham and Isaac.  To provide some context, I will 
include a bit of the passage in Fear and Trembling that appears before the Kierkegaardian line 
that Roethke explicitly quotes in his aphorism. 
The ethical expression for what Abraham did is, that he would murder Isaac; the religious 
expression is, that he would sacrifice Isaac; but precisely in this contradiction consists the 
dread which can well make a man sleepless, and yet Abraham is not what he is without 
this dread… For my part I do not lack the courage to think a thought whole.  Hitherto 
there has been no thought that I have been afraid of; If I should run across such a thought, 
I hope that I have at least the sincerity to say, “I am afraid of this thought, it stirs up 
something else in me, and therefore I will not think it.  If in this I do wrong, the 
punishment will not fail to follow.”105 
 
In this passage Kierkegaard describes his idea that it is important, that it is even courageous, to 
be willing think the fullness of a thought, even if the fullness of that thought implies some form 
of “contradiction” or leads to some unsettling conclusion.  The contradiction, of course, being 
the possibility that a supposedly all-good being could command that something evil be done.  It 
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is impossible for a perfect being to do something imperfect, or to request that someone do 
something imperfect, yet Kierkegaard thinks that if one is to be honest in thinking about faith 
then one must be willing to think the impossible.  Thinking these kinds of impossible thoughts 
does not lead to comfort and tranquility, it leads to sleeplessness, but at the same time it 
intensifies the relation of the single individual to their life and their faith.   
 The main point of all of this is clear: Kierkegaard thought that paradox serves an 
important function in the intensification and vitalization of the inner life.  Paradox, for 
Kierkegaard, can be described of as a generative tension. Paradoxes are cognitively 
uncomfortable and hard – if not impossible – for us to think about, but always at the same time 
they force us to choose for ourselves how to live in relation to them, and what kind of life is best 
lived in a world characterized by paradox.   
The important question for this inquiry is, of course, how does Roethke implement the 
ideas about the importance of paradox that Kierkegaard seems to have inspired him to consider?  
The answer appears readily; one need look no further than his poetry.  His poetry and prose are 
both packed with instances of paradox, and these paradoxes seem to work in alignment with 
Kierkegaard’s general attitudes about paradox that were just outlined. 
 I will start my brief investigation into Roethke’s attitudes towards paradox by referring to 
a puzzling passage on paradox that can be found in his essay titled “On Identity.”  This passage 
states in a very Kierkegaardian way that the existence of paradox leads to a heightened 
experience of self-identity.  Roethke does not try to deconstruct the paradox that he presents 
logically, but instead, like Kierkegaard, he embraces paradox as existentially invigorating, and as 
the kind of thing that enhances one’s engagement with the task of living.  Also, as in 




relationship between oneself and other beings.  While Kierkegaard usually describes this kind of 
paradox as occurring between humans and God, Roethke – in this instance – secularizes it and 
describes it as occurring between oneself and otherness in general.  Roethke does retain the 
mysterious, semi-mystical tone of Kierkegaard’s thinking on this topic, but he also broadens the 
ontological conditions within which this kind of experience of paradox can occur.  This makes 
sense, especially since Roethke’s poetry often describes the relationship between humans and the 
non-human plant-world in consecrated language.106 In this passage that follows Roethke even 
explicitly states that “an inanimate thing” can be one of the beings that facilitates this sort of 
experience of paradoxical self-encountering. Roethke describes the paradoxical relationship 
between other and self-understanding as follows: 
It is paradoxical that a very sharp sense of the being, the identity of some other being— 
and in some instances, even an inanimate thing— brings a corresponding heightening and 
awareness of one’s own self, and, even more mysteriously, in some instances, a feeling of 
the oneness of the universe. Both feelings are not always present, I’m aware, but either 
can be an occasion for gratitude.107  
 
In this passage Roethke describes the experience of paradox as an existentially generative 
experience.  He says that it leads to a “heightening and awareness of one’s own self,” but does 
not attempt to provide a rational explanation for this phenomenon.  He does describe it as 
paradoxical, and this description can give us a basis from which to speculate about the sort of 
experience that he is trying to describe, especially if we read his thoughts on paradox as being 
informed by Kierkegaard’s thoughts on paradox. If we do this, we can understand that Roethke is 
saying that the “sharp,” irreconcilable clash between self and other throws the self back against 
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itself in a way that facilitates self-examination.108  In so doing it forces the self to analyze who 
and what kind of being it is.  This way of thinking is consistent with Roethke’s poetic tendency 
in which his narrators find themselves vitalized when in the presence of the radically other things 
of nature – clams, weeds, and assorted vegetation.  The presence of alterity paradoxically leads 
to an experience of self-identity.  I have presented other examples of this occurring during earlier 
during discussion of Roethke’s poems such as “Weed Puller,” “A Field of Light,” and “Long 
Live the Weeds.”  In each case the paradoxical experience of the sharp, irreconcilability of 
alterity leads to the narrator falling back on themselves and gaining a greater appreciation and 
existential sense of who they are. 
 Within Roethke’s actual poetry there are many directly paradoxical statements made, and 
most of them align well with the way in which the existential purpose of paradox has been being 
described in this section.  I will provide just a few examples of Roethke’s poetic use of paradox 
to demonstrate that Roethke uses paradox to serve existential ends that can easily be interpreted 
in an existential, Kierkegaardian register.   
 In “Once More, The Round” Roethke delivers one of his most directly paradoxical 
statements.  This poem, which we previously discussed in the context of its Blake, concerns itself 
with knowledge and a sense of belonging within the context of a diverse world.  The second line 
in the first stanza is where we can find this paradox. 
 What’s greater, Pebble or Pond? 
 What can be known? The Unknown. 
 My true self runs towards a Hill 
 More! O More! Visible.109 
 
                                                 
108 This idea of the self relating itself to itself is meant to evoke the description of the self that 
Kierkegaard gives in the previously discussed opening passage of The Sickness Unto Death.  




This poem describes an active clash between the knowable and the unknowable.  The intelligible 
and the unintelligible clash against one another in a paradoxical relationship of dependency.  
Moreover, this paradoxical clash is described as a precondition for visibility; for the true 
appearance of things to appear in the first place.  “More! O More! visible.” Only after the 
experience of the clash between knowability and unknowability can the self appear to itself in 
the paradoxical way that it truly is.110 The paradoxical claim that defines Socratic ignorance 
remains as the condition for possibility for self-understanding even in Roethke.111  The 
experience of paradox initiates that process of generative tension that was previously described. 
 Roethke’s well-regarded poem “The Waking” from his 1953 book of poems The Waking 
also plays off a similar experience of paradox.  The hypnotic, incantatory rhythms of the poems 
describes someone who finds themself in a middle state between knowledge and ignorance, a 
middle state that recalls the hypnopompic state that one experiences when transitioning from 
sleep to wakefulness.  Consider the first two stanzas of this poem: 
 I wake to sleep, and take my waking slow. 
 I feel my fate in what I cannot fear. 
 I learn by going where I have to go. 
 
 We think by feeling.  What is there to know? 
 I hear my being dance from ear to ear. 
 I wake to sleep, and take my waking slow.112 
 
The critical line in this poem, which I have italicized, is “We think by feeling.  What is there to 
know?”  Traditionally thinking (reason) and feeling (emotion) are described as opposed to one 
                                                 
110 See footnote 92. 
111 Unsurprisingly Kierkegaard was deeply enamored with Socrates.  Kierkegaard made constant 
reference to Socrates in his writing, and considered him perhaps the greatest of all thinkers.  
Kierkegaard’s doctoral thesis was even written on Socrates.  Written in 1841, it was titled “On 
the Concept of Irony With Continual Reference to Socrates.” 




another, but Roethke complicates this relationship.  He suggests that these two distinct faculties 
of experiences are deeply united, and that they even imply one another.  Reason is that which 
paradoxically allows us to grasp our fundamental irrationality and emotional facticity, but in this 
grasping it is only grasping that which is fundamentally other than it.  Instead of being separable, 
thought informs feeling and feeling informs thought.  “What is there is there to know?” questions 
whether there is some sort of external, objective knowledge that we can access through reason, 
or whether knowledge is something otherwise – perhaps an existential praxis rather than a 
cognitive apprehension of a coherent external reality.  
 There are several other examples of paradox that Roethke uses to generate a similar 
existential experience.113  “In a Dark Time” is the first poem in the metaphysical sequence of 
Roethke’s 1964 book The Far Field. This poem starts out with a bold and directly paradoxical 
claim, and this claim is what holds this poem together.114  The poem – as is the case with so 
many other poems by Roethke – is focused on the difficult journey towards self-understanding. 
The protagonist, once again, finds themself in the middle of a situation characterized by stark 
and abrupt contrasts.  But, as has been displayed in previous discussions of Roethke’s poems, it 
is during these limit situations that the narrator comes closer to knowing who they are.115  What 
follows is the entirety of “In a Dark Time.”  The primary paradox is contained in the first line of 
the poem, but one can also be seen in the third line, too. However, each line is relevant to 
understanding the energetic existential character of Roethke’s poetry.  This poem captures the 
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paradoxical nature of the first line in this poem.   
115 I attribute my use of the term of “limit situations” to Karl Jaspers, who was a 19th century 




fraught journey of self-understanding very nicely, and stands out as a particularly clear example 
of Roethke pairing paradox with intense self-engagement. 
 In a dark time, the eye begins to see, 
 I meet my shadow in the deepening shade; 
 I hear my echo in the echoing wood – 
 A lord of nature weeping to a tree. 
 I live between the heron and the wren, 
 Beasts of the hill and serpents of the den. 
 
 What’s madness but nobility of soul 
 At odds with circumstance? The day’s on fire! 
 I know the purity of pure despair, 
 My shadow pinned against a sweating wall. 
 That place among the rocks – is it a cave, 
 Or winding path? The edge is what I have. 
 
A steady storm of correspondences! 
A night flowing with birds, a ragged moon,    
And in broad day the midnight come again!    
A man goes far to find out what he is— 
Death of the self in a long, tearless night,    
All natural shapes blazing unnatural light. 
 
Dark, dark my light, and darker my desire.    
My soul, like some heat-maddened summer fly,    
Keeps buzzing at the sill. Which I is I? 
A fallen man, I climb out of my fear.    
The mind enters itself, and God the mind,    
And one is One, free in the tearing wind.116 
 
Once again in this poem we see the paradox of the narrator gaining insight into their identity 
through the experience of paradox.  It is within the darkness, within the removal of the 
possibility for vision, that one can begin to see who they are: “In a dark time, the eye begins to 
see.”  This continues in line with the idea that the stark experience of otherness leads to the 
experience of self, and that the clash between irreconcilables (light/dark) leads to existential 
invigoration (sight).  Along these lines, there is a sense of growth occurring in the midst of 
                                                 




inhospitable conditions. In the same way that the plant grown in the “barren soil,” so too does the 
human gain the capacity for existential vision and self-understanding only upon encountering a 
situation of extreme darkness.117 This is the same form of paradoxical growth that Kierkegaard 
described in the earlier passages.  In this poem by Roethke he also describes “the purity of pure 
despair” and “the edge” being “what I have.”  In both cases a similar idea is conveyed:  It is 
within the extreme conditions of despair and in the inhospitable conditions at the edges of 
experience that we might find the capacity to begin to live again.   
The last line of the third stanza contains a third intensifying paradox: “All natural shapes 
blazing unnatural light.”  Here, as in Kierkegaard’s discussion of the “absolute paradox,” the 
heavenly (unnatural) clashes with the mundane (natural).  A dramatic tension unravels when 
these two unlike kinds are brought together in paradoxical unity.  We can see Roethke use 
paradox to generate the sense that all things are illumined by an active, mystical force; a 
mysterious penumbra sets things apart while also bringing them together.  The one and the many 
unite in the dramatic dance of difference; they are distinct but inseparable.  Even the narrator’s 
identity itself is subject to the interplay of the one and the many.   “Which I is I?”  This question 
– and the other paradoxical questions – are never given final answers, but instead are treated as 
fundamental, vitalizing questions that disclose the paradoxical conditions of human experience. 
 Like Kierkegaard in his prose, Roethke’s paradox as a device generates the sense of 
intensity and passion that he thought made his poetry existentially efficacious.  In On Poetry and 
Craft Roethke discussed intensity in the context of stimulating spiritual self-examination.  He 
wrote: 
This struggle for spiritual identity is, of course, one of the perpetual recurrences… He 
must be able to shift his rhythms rapidly, the tension. He works intuitively, and the final 
                                                 




form of his poem must be imaginatively right. If intensity has compressed the language 
so it seems, on early reading, obscure, this obscurity should break open suddenly for the 
serious reader who can hear the language: the ‘meaning’ itself should come as a dramatic 
revelation, an excitement.118 
 
Paradox conveys Roethke’s deep philosophical commitments to existential energy and self-
examination; commitments which were discussed in the earlier aphorisms and in the earlier 
passage from “On Identity.”119 Paradox generates the intensity that stimulates self-examination 
and allows us to forge identity within the multifarious forms of chaos in modern life.  When 
listing some issues that he takes to be core themes of his work he enumerates “1) The 
multiplicity, the chaos of modern life; 2) The way, the means of establishing a personal identity; 
A self in the face of that chaos.”120 As I have been trying to demonstrate through various 
methods within this thesis, the issue of striving to forge a sense of identity within the confusing, 
contradictory context of existence is always at the forefront of Roethke’s work, and Roethke 
asserts this claim clearly in this last quote.  
But in what other ways does Roethke identify with Kierkegaard’s thoughts on paradox?  I 
will consider this question in the final brief section of this paper, and I contend that Roethke 
thought that paradox could also serve as a generally applicable model for thinking about the 
pedagogical relationship between teacher and student, and not merely just as a poetic device to 
awaken individuals from existential languor.   
3.2 Paradoxical Pedagogy 
 In at least two different instances Roethke cited Kierkegaard as an inspiration for shaping 
his thoughts about the authentic experience of education.  He quotes the same line by 
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Kierkegaard both times. First, in “On Identity” in a section discussing one of his former students, 
Roethke writes: “Besides, his prose was better than mine. I felt that, in Kierkegaardian terms, we 
had reached the true state of education in one bound: the student was teaching the teacher.”121 
Around this time, which was also near the end of Roethke’s life, a short film was made about 
Roethke’s poetry.122  This film, fittingly titled In A Dark Time, contains scenes of Roethke 
talking and reading poems edited with other relevant scenes, such as ferns unfurling and 
pedestrian packed streets.  In the opening sequence of this film, around the two minute and 
fifteen second mark, Roethke is captured on film saying the lines: “As Kierkegaard said, 
education begins when the teacher starts learning from the students.”123 
 In both cases Roethke is clearly referring to the same Kierkegaardian idea.  This quote 
can originally be found in The Point of View for My Work as an Author where Kierkegaard in his 
own voice and not in the voice of pseudonym writes: “Instruction begins with this, that you, the 
teacher, learn from the learner, place yourself in what he has understood and how he has 
understood it…”124 This, among other things, demonstrates that Roethke was familiar with 
Kierkegaardian texts other than the ones I identified in the first section of this thesis.  While the 
idea of a teacher and a student switching roles is not quite as a strong paradox as other paradoxes 
that Roethke presents – such as the unknown being all that is knowable – this Kierkegaardian 
idea still turns on a paradoxical idea.125  Specifically, it turns on the idea of dissimilar things 
                                                 
121 Ibid. 36 
122 The Movie “In A Dark Time” was made in 1960.  “On Identity,” which was originally written 
as a speech given at a conference on “Identity” at Northwestern University, was written in 
February 1963.  Roethke died suddenly on August 1, 1963 while swimming in a neighbor’s pool 
in Bainbridge Island, Washington.  The pool has allegedly since been filled in and turned into a 
zen garden. 
123 Need citation for this movie.  Two minute and 15 second mark. 
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becoming similar and even potentially reversing and overtaking one another.  Oppositional 
forces are brought together in a complex pedagogical tension. As I have shown, this paradoxical 
theme is repeated over and again throughout Roethke’s work in which he often places 
oppositional figures and forces in a tense, paradoxical relationship with one another. 
 The fact that Roethke repeated this quotation in two different major contexts – in a public 
speech and in a film about his life and work – suggests that Roethke must have recognized 
something very important in this Kierkegaardian idea about paradoxical pedagogy.  The spirit of 
Kierkegaard’s paradoxical statement about pedagogy seems to be in alignment with the kind of 
thinking that Roethke finds generative and that has been discussed throughout the course of this 
paper.  In attempting to reconcile opposites and in attempting to think the unthinkable new 
possibilities for existential growth and expansion appear.  With regards to a topic as difficult as 
instruction in writing poetry – which is a task that consumed much of Roethke’s attention while 
he worked in academia – alternative methods of pedagogy must be experimented with, and this is 
precisely what Kierkegaard’s idea provides.  The static model of an instructor lecturing 
unidirectionally to passive pupils was inadequate for Roethke’s pedagogical pursposes, 
especially given that he thought of good poetry as being characterized by energy and intensity.126  
One can scarcely learn energy by being lectured to in a static relation; instruction in “energy” 
must necessarily be a dynamic and co-active process.  The fixed roles of teacher and student – 
with the former being the sole dispenser of knowledge and the latter being the sole receiver of 
knowledge – must be undermined in order for this pedagogy of creative energy to occur in the 
first place.   
                                                 




In his collection of aphorisms titled “The Teaching of Poetry” Roethke states “The 
professor is supposed to know.  I am not of that breed.”127 Later in “First Class,” another 
collection of aphorism, Roethke bluntly states: “Look, I’m the greatest dumb teacher alive.”128 
The instructor must recognize the vast array of distinctive personas within the classroom, and 
must cultivate an atmosphere or energy and cooperation.  The teacher and the student must 
struggle with language together.129 In “The Teaching Poet” Roethke describes this sort of 
energetic, cooperative pedagogical atmosphere: 
The class in writing poetry is a collective, cooperative act – most of the time.  But to 
bring diverse people, including the neurotic, the pigheaded, the badly trained, is a task 
that must be assumed, at first, by the teacher… Discussions have to be free and easy, 
otherwise the whole method breaks down.  And often, during the first weeks, the 
instructor has to bring all his energy, tact, teaching wisdom into play in order to get a 
genuine rapport, a sense of mutual respect.130 
 
Notice here he describes the class itself as an “act.”  It is a necessarily active process rather than 
a static thing – as is the case with Kierkegaard’s concept of the self, it is verbal rather than 
nounal.  This idea of an “act” that Roethke describes also shares the element of performativity 
that Kierkegaard displayed in his adoption of pseudonyms. After the teacher has initiated the 
cooperative, dynamic task, then the roles may be blurred together.  Mutually exclusive categories 
of understanding must be forced to include and overlap with one another; the teacher must learn 
from the learner, and the learner must teach the teacher. Roles must shift and interrelate in order 
for energetic, existential poetry to occur and appear.  The static stillness of traditional pedagogy 
is non-conducive to this unique pedagogical task, so the alternative Kierkegaardian model must 
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overtake and replace it.131 This is a paradoxical model of pedagogy that Roethke presents us 
with, especially given that the teacher is not the student, and the student is not the teacher – they 
are categorically opposed to one another.  But for Roethke they must be both at the same time.  
The paradox must be embraced, and the tension that this paradox produces should be 
pedagogically, existentially, and poetically generative. 
 This idea that paradox can be existentially, poetically, and even pedagogically 
meaningful is only one of many of the unique, existentially relevant ideas that Roethke offers to 
us within his complex body of work, and only one of the many that I have presented in this 
paper.  Surely there are many more similar ideas and themes that bind Roethke and Kierkegaard 
together, and that reveal the generally existential character of Roethke’s poetry, but this is the 
last of which I will discuss in this thesis.  With this final idea, I will know turn to a few final 
remarks which will summarize the major ideas that have been herein discussed. 
3.3 Concluding Comments 
 In this thesis I have demonstrated that there has been a lack of scholarship that attempts 
to place Roethke’s poetry within the existential traditional.  Thus, I have set it as my task to fill 
this void by tracing the existential influence on Roethke’s life and work.  In so doing I have 
contended not only that Roethke’s writing has a distinctly Kierkegaardian existential character, 
but also that he also had an understanding and appreciation of existential philosophy more 
generally.  I have also tracked certain existential themes – such as the relationship between death 
and life, between vitality and growth, between paradox and self-identity, and between paradox 
and pedagogy – as they appear in both Roethke’s poetry and prose.  In all this it has been my 
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hope to explore an as-yet undertheorized dimension of Roethke’s poetry, and to simultaneously 
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